Nowadays investors are measuring the performances of a business organization not only based on their operating efficiency but also fulfilling their social responsibility. At least the investors need to know whether the activities of the business have any adverse impact on the society and environment. This study explores the accountability of the business from the social and environmental context. This empirical study tends to investigate the nature of the ownership structure that influences the environmental disclosure of a business entity. Based on the sample of fifty-five DSE-listed textile companies, this study used multiple regression to assess the causal relationship between the ownership structure and corporate environmental disclosure. Moreover, this cross-sectional study also considers the agency theory and stakeholder theory to explain the relationship between the ownership structure and environmental disclosure. The findings indicate that corporate environmental disclosure is positively influenced by foreign ownership and institutional ownership whereas director ownership and public ownership have no significant association with the environmental disclosure. These insightful results challenge conventional assumptions and highlight the need for a nuanced understanding of the factors that drive environmental reporting practices in the context of an emerging economy. The main contribution of this article lies in its provision of empirical evidence from an emerging economy, Bangladesh, which helps in understanding sustainable practices in a global context. Additionally, it aids in developing effective corporate governance policies and strategies tailored to similar emerging economies by recognizing the role of ownership structures in influencing environmental accountability. These findings further assist policymakers, managers, and other sustainability advocates in understanding how different ownership structures affect corporate environmental disclosure.

This paper aims to explore the relationship between corporate overinvestment and management incentives, focusing particularly on the influence of different ownership structures. Utilizing agency theory and ownership structure theory, this study constructs a theoretical framework and posits hypotheses on how management incentives might influence corporate overinvestment behaviors under different ownership structures. Listed companies from 2010 to 2020 were selected as the research sample, and the hypotheses were empirically tested using descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, and regression analysis. The findings suggest that a relatively concentrated ownership structure may encourage management to adopt more cautious investment strategies, thus reducing overinvestment behaviors; while under a dispersed ownership structure, the relationship between management incentives and overinvestment is more complex. This study provides new evidence on how management incentive mechanisms influence corporate decision-making in different ownership environments, offering significant theoretical and practical implications for improving internal control and incentive mechanisms.