The performance of Public Enterprises (PEs) in Namibia has been a long and contentious issue, clamored by continuous bailouts in the face of constant poor performance. The trend of financial bailouts to PEs in Namibia over the years has attracted increased attention into the dynamics of poor PE performance and their fiscal burden on the state. The Namibian government has taken active steps in cutting on PE bailouts and demanding improved performance or face closure. By looking at recent developments in the governance of PEs in Namibia, the purpose and objective of the current study is to analyze whether the current stance and trajectory of government decisions spells a post-honeymoon period in which poor performing PEs will ‘wither and survive or die’ if they do not improve their sustainability index by not relying on financial bailouts. This analysis is aided by the insights provided by the stakeholder, institutional and principal-agent theories. Through the qualitative research method, this study finds that the Namibian government has taken a new attitude and approach in which it will no longer blindly accept and tolerate the poor performance of PEs through continuous bailouts as seen in the past. PEs that are withering will now either survive (through reforms) or die (through liquidation or dissolution).

The paper at hand analyses the principal-agent relationship, where comparative perspective between principals’ (municipalities) and agents’ (public utility providers) in the field of water and wastewater management is scrutinized. The goal of the paper is twofold: firstly, to present empirical results validating principal-agent relationships that emerged due to the reorganization process of public enterprises; secondly, to highlight the similarities and differences between the perspectives of principals and agents regarding motives, advantages and disadvantages, and price-setting in relation to the reorganization process. The empirical research is based on the primary data collected through two self-prepared and structured online questionnaires—one for municipalities, and the other for public utility providers. The results reveal similarities between public enterprises and municipalities in motivating factors for full municipal ownership. However, differences are seen among the advantages of the reorganization process. Price-setting by public utilities is recognized as a motivating mechanism for agents.