Using company size as a moderator, this article examines the MENA region’s gender balance on boards and how it influences capital structure. The study uses the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimate technique to analyze data from a sample of 556 non-financial organizations across 10 MENA countries from 2010 to 2023. The results show that a lower debt ratio is connected with a higher percentage of female board members. Further steps towards debt reduction include increasing the number of independent female board members and decreasing the board’s overall size. The opposite is true for larger enterprises, more profitability, more expansion opportunities, and macroeconomic variables like inflation and GDP growth, which tend to raise the debt ratio. Capital structure decisions in the MENA area are influenced by gender diversity on boards and business characteristics. Therefore, Companies in the MENA area would do well to support initiatives that increase the representation of women on corporate boards. One way to achieve this goal is to establish gender diversity targets or launch programs to increase the number of women serving on boards of directors, particularly in positions of power.

This paper aims to explore the relationship between corporate overinvestment and management incentives, focusing particularly on the influence of different ownership structures. Utilizing agency theory and ownership structure theory, this study constructs a theoretical framework and posits hypotheses on how management incentives might influence corporate overinvestment behaviors under different ownership structures. Listed companies from 2010 to 2020 were selected as the research sample, and the hypotheses were empirically tested using descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, and regression analysis. The findings suggest that a relatively concentrated ownership structure may encourage management to adopt more cautious investment strategies, thus reducing overinvestment behaviors; while under a dispersed ownership structure, the relationship between management incentives and overinvestment is more complex. This study provides new evidence on how management incentive mechanisms influence corporate decision-making in different ownership environments, offering significant theoretical and practical implications for improving internal control and incentive mechanisms.

Nowadays investors are measuring the performances of a business organization not only based on their operating efficiency but also fulfilling their social responsibility. At least the investors need to know whether the activities of the business have any adverse impact on the society and environment. This study explores the accountability of the business from the social and environmental context. This empirical study tends to investigate the nature of the ownership structure that influences the environmental disclosure of a business entity. Based on the sample of fifty-five DSE-listed textile companies, this study used multiple regression to assess the causal relationship between the ownership structure and corporate environmental disclosure. Moreover, this cross-sectional study also considers the agency theory and stakeholder theory to explain the relationship between the ownership structure and environmental disclosure. The findings indicate that corporate environmental disclosure is positively influenced by foreign ownership and institutional ownership whereas director ownership and public ownership have no significant association with the environmental disclosure. These insightful results challenge conventional assumptions and highlight the need for a nuanced understanding of the factors that drive environmental reporting practices in the context of an emerging economy. The main contribution of this article lies in its provision of empirical evidence from an emerging economy, Bangladesh, which helps in understanding sustainable practices in a global context. Additionally, it aids in developing effective corporate governance policies and strategies tailored to similar emerging economies by recognizing the role of ownership structures in influencing environmental accountability. These findings further assist policymakers, managers, and other sustainability advocates in understanding how different ownership structures affect corporate environmental disclosure.

This research aims to assess the impact of bargaining power on budget implementation while also considering the deviation in capital expenditure as a moderating factor. The research sample included 34 provincial governments in Indonesia between 2019 and 2022. The sample determination method used purposive sampling, so the final sample size was 134 observations. The research employed panel data regression to test the hypotheses and continued with the Chow, Lagrange multiplier, and Hausman tests. The study results indicate that bargaining power has a positive and significant effect on budget implementation, with the deviation in capital expenditure not diminishing its impact. The research’s practical implication is that regional governments must effectively manage their revenues to finance regional spending needs through regional tax intensification and extensification policies. The study contributes to signaling theory by highlighting that regional governments can finance regional spending needs through fiscal independence and society’s involvement. It also contributes to agency theory by demonstrating that capital expenditure deviation in the form of information asymmetry in regional governments does not reduce their ability to finance regional expenditure needs. Nonetheless, the study suggests that the proxies used in this research are limited, and further exploration of other proxies to measure tested variables. This research provides new knowledge for stakeholders regarding the dynamics of regional budgeting, especially regarding assessing the impact of bargaining power on budget implementation and considering deviations in capital expenditure as a moderating factor.