The state delivery of affordable and sustainable housing continues to be a complicated challenge in Africa, and there is a need to encourage private sector participation. As a result, this study examines the risks associated with private sector participation in affordable housing and supporting infrastructure investment and the strategies towards mitigating the risks from an Afrocentric perspective. The evidence from a systematic literature review was coupled with the opinion of an international expert panel to address the paper’s aim and provide recommendations for developing improved housing and supporting infrastructure in Sub-Saharan Africa. The review outcomes and the qualitative data from the panel discussion were analysed using thematic analysis. The results revealed that market dynamics, land supply and acquisition constraints, cost of construction materials, unsupportive policies, and technical and financial factors constitute risks to affordable housing in the region. Mitigation strategies include leveraging joint efforts, strengths, and resource bases, increasing access to land and finance for private sector participation, developing a supportive government framework to promote an enabling environment for easy access to land acquisition and development finance, local production of building materials, research and technology adoption. In line with the United Nations (UN) Agenda 2030 targets and principles, reforms are required across the housing value chain, involving the private sector and community. Application of the study’s recommendations could minimise the risks of affordable housing delivery and enhance private sector participation.

This paper proposes a floating-interest-rate infrastructure bond, where the interest of a government bond is paid to investors during the period of construction and the early period of operation. Unlike the usual government bond, which provides a fixed interest rate, the proposed floating-interest-rate infrastructure bond pays a floating interest, the rate of which depends on spillover tax revenues. Effective infrastructure projects have a positive effect on the economic growth of a region, known as the spillover effect. When user charges and the return from spillover tax revenues are below the fixed rate of the government bond, the interest rate will equal to the fixed rate of the government bond. In this case, investors in the infrastructure will receive interest on the government bond at the minimum rate. As the spillover effect of the infrastructure increases, the rate of return for infrastructure investment will become greater than the fixed rate of the government bond. The success of the floating-interest-rate infrastructure bond depends on the spillover effect and on transparency and accountability. Policy recommendations are provided in this paper on how to increase the spillover effect and improve transparency and accountability. 

This paper uses Public Choice analysis to examine the case for and experience with Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). A PPP is a contractual platform which connects a governmental body and a private entity. The goal is to provide a public sector program, service, or asset that would normally be provided exclusively by a public sector entity. This paper focuses on PPPs in developed countries, but it also draws on studies of PPPs in developing countries. The economics literature generally defines PPPs as long-term contractual arrangements between a public authority (local or central government) and a private supplier for the delivery of services. The private sector supplier takes responsibility for building infrastructure components, securing financing of the investment, and then managing and maintaining this facility.

However, in addition to those formed through contracts, PPPs may take other forms such as those developed in response to tax subvention or coercion, as in the case of regulatory mandates. A key element of PPP is that the private partner takes on a significant portion of the risk through a schedule of specified remuneration, contingency payments, and provision for dispute resolution. PPPs typically are long-term arrangements and involve large corporations on the private side, but may also be limited to specific phases of a project.

The types of PPPs discussed in this paper exclude arrangements which may result from government mandates such as the statutory emission mandates imposed on automobile manufacturers and industrial facilities (e.g., power plants). It also excludes PPP-like organizations resulting from US section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides tax subsidies for certain public charities, scientific research organizations, and organizations whose goals are to prevent cruelty to animals or erect public monuments at no expense to the government. This paper concludes that an array of Public Choice tools are applicable to understanding the emergence, success, or failure of PPPs. Several short case studies are provided to illustrate the practicalities of PPPs. 

In many cases, the expected efficiency advantages of public-private partnership (PPP) projects as a specific form of infrastructure provision did not materialize ex post. From a Public Choice perspective, one simple explanation for many of the problems surrounded by the governance of PPPs is that the public decision-makers being involved in the process of initiating and implementing PPP projects (namely, politicians and public bureaucrats) in many situations make low- cost decisions in the sense of Kirchgässner (1948–2017). That is, their decisions may have a high impact on the wealth of the jurisdiction in which the PPP is located (most notably, on the welfare of citizen-taxpayers in this jurisdiction) but, at the same time, these decisions often only have a low impact on the private welfare of the individual decision-makers in politics and bureaucracy. The latter, for example, in many settings often have a low economic incentive to monitor/control what the private-sector partners are doing (or not doing) within a PPP arrangement. The purpose of this paper is to draw greater attention to the problems created by low-cost decisions for the governance of PPPs. Moreover, the paper discusses potential remedies arising from the viewpoint of Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy.

 Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are vital for infrastructure development in developing countries, integrating private efficiency with public oversight. However, PPP models often face risks, particularly in Indonesia’s water sector, due to its unique geographical and regulatory challenges. This study aims to identify and evaluate risk factors specific to drinking water PPP projects in Indonesia. Using a quantitative approach, structured questionnaires were distributed to experts in the sector, and the data was analyzed using a fuzzy evaluation method. Risks were categorized into location, design and construction, financial, operational, revenue, and political. The study emphasizes that effective risk management, including identification, analysis, and mitigation, is essential for project success. It highlights the importance of stakeholder involvement and flexible risk management strategies. Comprehensive and proactive risk management is key to the success of drinking water infrastructure projects. The research suggests that an integrated and collaborative approach among stakeholders can enhance risk management effectiveness. These findings provide valuable insights for policymakers, project managers, investors, and other stakeholders, underscoring the necessity for adaptable regulatory frameworks and robust policy guidelines to improve the sustainability and efficacy of future water-related PPPs.

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are mostly presented as a means to introduce efficient procurement methods and better value for money to taxpayers. However, the complexity of the PPP mechanism, their lack of transparency, accounting rules and implicit liabilities make it often impossible to perceive the amount of public expenditure involved and the long-run impact on taxpayers, providing room for fiscal illusion, i.e., the illusion that PPPs are much less expensive than traditional public investments. This psaper, thanks to a systematic review of the literature on the EU countries experience, tries to unveil the sources of this illusion by looking at the reasons behind the PPPs’ choice, their real costs, and the sources of fiscal risks. The literature suggests that PPPs are more costly than public funding, especially when contingent liabilities are not taken into account, and are employed as mechanisms to circumvent budgetary restrictions and to spend off-balance. The paper concludes that the public sector should share more risks with private sectors by reducing the amount of guarantees, and should prevent governments from operating through a sleight of hand that deflects attention away from off-balance financing, by applying a neutral fiscal recording system.