The aim of this study was to elucidate the expected moderating effect exerted by institutional owners on the intricate correlation between the characteristics of boards of directors and the issue of earnings management, as gauged by the loan loss provisions.The sample encompassed all the banks listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) over the period between 2010 and 2022, representing a total of 151 observations. The results derived from the examination clearly demonstrate that the institutional owners have a key impact on augmenting the monitoring tasks and responsibilities of the boards of directors across the study sample. The results revealed the fundamental role of such owners in strengthening the supervisory tasks carried out by boards of directors in Jordan. A panel data model has been used in the analysis. The results of this study show that the presence of the owner of an institution has a discernible moderating role in the banks' monitoring landscape. Indeed, their presence strengthens the monitoring tasks of the banks’ boards by underscoring the quest to restrict the EM decisions. Interestingly, the results support the monitoring proposition outlined by agency theory, which introduced CG recommendations as a deterrent tool to reduce the expectation gap between banks' owners and their representatives.