The study looks into how governance qualities of decentralized governments mediate the impacts of decentralization on development. Based on a set-oriented approach, the study analyzed data from a nation-wide survey conducted with business managers from all provinces in Indonesia, and found evidence that, despite the country’s uniform decentralization reform, individual provinces exhibited great variation in the qualities of their various physical and institutional infrastructures. Notably, these qualities assumed nested relations, with order and security as well as accountability and rule of law seemingly being the preconditions of basic infrastructure provision as well as local governments’ coordination. Moreover, business investment decisions (measured as staff expansion and product innovation) were found to vary with some specific combinations of these infrastructural conditions. The result provides evidence supporting the argument that both physical and institutional infrastructures are instrumental to realize the supposed benefits of decentralization and supports the recent call of the literature to look into the political-institutional complex in the process of decentralization reform.

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) can be an effective way of delivering infrastructure. However, achieving value for money can be difficult if government agencies are not equipped to manage them effectively. Experience from OECD countries shows that the availability of finance is not the main obstacle in delivering infrastructure. Governance—effective decision-making—is the most influential aspect on the quality of an investment, including PPP investments. In 2012, the OECD together with its member countries developed principles to ensure that PPPs deliver value for money transparently and prudently, supported by the right institutional capacities and processes to harness the upside of PPPs without jeopardizing fiscal sustainability. Survey results from OECD countries show that some dimensions of the recommended practices are well applied and past and ongoing reforms show progress. However, other principles have not been well implemented, reflecting the continuing need for improving public governance of PPPs across countries.

The wealth of nations depends on the quality of their infrastructure. Often, however, infrastructure suffers from ineffective investments and poor maintenance. Proposed solutions, such as New Public Management or Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) tend to develop into Politicians-Private Partnerships as politicians collude with private firms to exploit present and future tax-payers. Therefore, it is necessary to give citizens better control over collective decision making. While there is a significant economic literature on empowering citizens via decentralization and direct democratic institutions, the role of electoral rules has thus far been rather neglected. An interesting case in point is Switzerland, which is well known for its high-quality infrastructure, extensive decentralization, and direct democracy. However, this paper argues that there is an additional and previously neglected institution that moves Swiss politicians away from client politics towards better serving public interest: Switzerland’s unique electoral institutions which effectively combine proportional elections with multi-seat majority elections. We explain how these institutions work, how they enhance the relationships between citizens and public and private entities, and we argue that they could be implemented in other countries.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) wants to become a key regional actor in the Arctic. PRC's underlying priority in the region is gaining access to commercial opportunities from trade and natural resources. To this end, PRC is building its domestic capacities for research and commercial development in the Arctic, increasing its involvement in multilateral forums on Arctic governance and deepening ties to Arctic nations, especially Russia.

Attitudes towards PRC among Arctic nations are diverging, but Beijing generally faces high levels of skepticism and opposition to its Arctic involvement, explicitly grounded in perceptions of PRC as a state undermining the rules-based international order and potential military build-up in the high north.

The analytical framework in this article builds on an outline authored by Exner-Pirot in 2012 (Exner-Pirot, 2012) to detail the current schools of thought within Arctic governance, and builds on it by including more recent developments in Arctic governance, incorporating the updated Arctic policies of most Arctic countries and connecting it to PRC.

This article contends that Beijing wants to change the status quo of Arctic governance and shift it towards a more accommodating approach to non-Arctic states. This article finds, based on the stated Arctic strategies of the eight Arctic states and PRC, that there are different views on Arctic governance where Arctic countries for the most part indicate an openness to a Chinese entry into the Arctic, albeit in diverging ways. This creates a complex governance scenario for PRC to navigate as it seeks to become a key Arctic player

This paper analyzed the equitable allocation of infrastructure across regional states in Ethiopia. In general, in the past years, there has been a good start in the infrastructure sector in Ethiopia. However, the governance and equity system of infrastructure in Ethiopia is not flexible, not technology-oriented, not fair, and not easily solved. The results of in-depth interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) showed that there is a lack of institutional capacity, infrastructure governance, and equity, which has negatively impacted the state- and nation-building processes in Ethiopia. According to the interviewees, so long as the unmet demand for infrastructure exists, it remains a key restrain on doing business in most Ethiopian regional states. This is due to the lack of integrated frameworks, as there are coordination failures (lack of proper government intervention, including a lack of proper understanding and implementation of the constitution and the federal system). In Ethiopia, to reduce these bottlenecks arising from the lack of institutional capacity, infrastructure governance, and equity and their effects on nation-building, first of all, the government has to critically hear the people, deeply assess the problems, and come to the point and then discuss the problems and the way forward with the society at large.

This paper contributes to a long-standing debate in development practice: under what conditions can externally established participatory groups engage in the collective management of services beyond the life of a project? Using 10 years of panel data on water point functionality from Indonesia’s rural water program, the Program for Community-Based Water Supply and Sanitation, the paper explored the determinants of subnational variation in infrastructure sustainability. It then investigated positive and negative deviance cases to answer why some communities successfully engaged in system management despite being located in difficult conditions as per quantitative findings and vice versa. The findings show that differences in the implementation of community participation, driven by local social relations between frontline service providers, that is, village authorities and water user groups, explain sustainable management. This initial condition of state-society relations influences how the project is initiated, kicking off negative or positive reinforcing pathways, leading to community collective action or exit. The paper concludes that the relationships between frontline government representatives and community actors are important and are an underexamined aspect of the ability of external projects to generate successful community-led management of public goods.