To achieve the energy transition and carbon neutrality targets, governments have implemented multiple policies to incentivize electricity suppliers to invest in renewable energy. Considering different government policies, we construct a renewable energy supply chain consisting of electricity suppliers and electricity retailers. We then explore the impact of four policies on electricity suppliers’ renewable energy investments, environmental impacts, and social welfare. We validated the results based on data from Wuxi, Jiangsu Province, China. The results show that government subsidy policies are more effective in promoting electricity suppliers to invest in renewable energy as consumer preferences increase, while no-government policies are the least effective. We also show that electricity suppliers are most profitable under the government subsidy policy and least profitable under the carbon cap-and-trade policy. Besides, our results indicate that social welfare is the worst under the carbon cap-and-trade policy. With the increase in carbon intensity and renewable energy quota, social welfare is the highest under the subsidy policy. However, the social welfare under the renewable energy portfolio standard is optimal when the renewable energy quota is low.

This paper aims to explore the relationship between corporate overinvestment and management incentives, focusing particularly on the influence of different ownership structures. Utilizing agency theory and ownership structure theory, this study constructs a theoretical framework and posits hypotheses on how management incentives might influence corporate overinvestment behaviors under different ownership structures. Listed companies from 2010 to 2020 were selected as the research sample, and the hypotheses were empirically tested using descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, and regression analysis. The findings suggest that a relatively concentrated ownership structure may encourage management to adopt more cautious investment strategies, thus reducing overinvestment behaviors; while under a dispersed ownership structure, the relationship between management incentives and overinvestment is more complex. This study provides new evidence on how management incentive mechanisms influence corporate decision-making in different ownership environments, offering significant theoretical and practical implications for improving internal control and incentive mechanisms.

This study is considered one of the few studies that attempted to explore the relationship between exports and foreign direct investment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The study aims to determine the nature of the relationship between exports and foreign direct investment in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during the period between (1990–2023). Employing Ender’s methodology using cointegration and error correction model. The study also relies on data on Saudi exports and foreign direct investment inflows from the World Bank databases. The results indicate the existence of Cointegration between foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows and the Saudi exports in the period (1990–2023), as for the causal relationship between the two variables, the results showed the causal relation between exports and FDI inflows from the direction of exports only, which means that Saudi exports cause FDI inflows in Saudi Arabia, and the study recommends giving more incentives to attract foreign investors in different sector rather than oil sector, besides improving the logistical services which is vital to any investment attraction strategy.

With the characteristics of resisting business cycle, mitigating cash flow, and improving portfolio resilience, special assets usually enter a highly active period in the economic downturn cycle, and gradually become an effective asset allocation means in the transition phase of the business cycle. This article aims to analyze the importance of the development of China's special asset investment industry in the context of high-quality economic development, and explore how to introduce market-oriented mechanisms to build primary and secondary markets for special assets, in order to improve the effective allocation of market resources and maximize returns.

We investigate the impact on intertemporal distribution caused by a change of policy from tax to deficit financing of public investment, using a simple theoretical framework which combines the one-period McGuire-Olson economy with the conventional long-run Solow economy. This theoretical framework provides a simple way to highlight some significant interdependencies between private and public investments as well as the negative impact of taxation on aggregate productivity, and to trace some possible transmission mechanisms between deficit financing policies and the long-run path of consumption per head. The main tentative (theoretical) result is that although under fairly acceptable assumptions the likely impact of a deficit financing policy is to benefit the present at the expense of the future, under equally acceptable assumptions concerning the possibility of an excessive macro private saving–investment propensity, and/or of a significant productivity loss due to the excess burden of taxation, the adverse intertemporal distributional impact of deficit financing might become negligible, or even disappear altogether.