It has become commonplace to describe publicly provided infrastructure as being in a sorry state and to advance public-private partnership as a possible remedy. This essay adopts a skeptical but not a cynical posture toward those claims. The paper starts by reviewing the comparative properties of markets and politics within a theory of budgeting where the options are construction and maintenance. This analytical point of departure explains how incongruities between political and market action can favor construction over maintenance. In short, political entities can engage in an implicit form of public debt by reducing maintenance spending to support other budgetary items. This implicit form of public debt does not manifest in higher interest rates but rather manifests in crumbling bridges and other infrastructure due to the transfer of maintenance into other budgetary activities.

The wealth of nations depends on the quality of their infrastructure. Often, however, infrastructure suffers from ineffective investments and poor maintenance. Proposed solutions, such as New Public Management or Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) tend to develop into Politicians-Private Partnerships as politicians collude with private firms to exploit present and future tax-payers. Therefore, it is necessary to give citizens better control over collective decision making. While there is a significant economic literature on empowering citizens via decentralization and direct democratic institutions, the role of electoral rules has thus far been rather neglected. An interesting case in point is Switzerland, which is well known for its high-quality infrastructure, extensive decentralization, and direct democracy. However, this paper argues that there is an additional and previously neglected institution that moves Swiss politicians away from client politics towards better serving public interest: Switzerland’s unique electoral institutions which effectively combine proportional elections with multi-seat majority elections. We explain how these institutions work, how they enhance the relationships between citizens and public and private entities, and we argue that they could be implemented in other countries.

In many cases, the expected efficiency advantages of public-private partnership (PPP) projects as a specific form of infrastructure provision did not materialize ex post. From a Public Choice perspective, one simple explanation for many of the problems surrounded by the governance of PPPs is that the public decision-makers being involved in the process of initiating and implementing PPP projects (namely, politicians and public bureaucrats) in many situations make low- cost decisions in the sense of Kirchgässner (1948–2017). That is, their decisions may have a high impact on the wealth of the jurisdiction in which the PPP is located (most notably, on the welfare of citizen-taxpayers in this jurisdiction) but, at the same time, these decisions often only have a low impact on the private welfare of the individual decision-makers in politics and bureaucracy. The latter, for example, in many settings often have a low economic incentive to monitor/control what the private-sector partners are doing (or not doing) within a PPP arrangement. The purpose of this paper is to draw greater attention to the problems created by low-cost decisions for the governance of PPPs. Moreover, the paper discusses potential remedies arising from the viewpoint of Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy.

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are mostly presented as a means to introduce efficient procurement methods and better value for money to taxpayers. However, the complexity of the PPP mechanism, their lack of transparency, accounting rules and implicit liabilities make it often impossible to perceive the amount of public expenditure involved and the long-run impact on taxpayers, providing room for fiscal illusion, i.e., the illusion that PPPs are much less expensive than traditional public investments. This psaper, thanks to a systematic review of the literature on the EU countries experience, tries to unveil the sources of this illusion by looking at the reasons behind the PPPs’ choice, their real costs, and the sources of fiscal risks. The literature suggests that PPPs are more costly than public funding, especially when contingent liabilities are not taken into account, and are employed as mechanisms to circumvent budgetary restrictions and to spend off-balance. The paper concludes that the public sector should share more risks with private sectors by reducing the amount of guarantees, and should prevent governments from operating through a sleight of hand that deflects attention away from off-balance financing, by applying a neutral fiscal recording system.

Sustainable leadership matters, spreads and lasts. It is shared responsibility, that does not unduly deplete human or financial resources, and that cares for avoids exerting negative damage on the surrounding educational and community environment. In fact, sustainability does not simply mean whether something can last. It addresses how particular initiatives can be developed without compromising the development of others in the surrounding environment, now and in the future. Sustainable leadership is one of the most valued characteristics that employers and stakeholders are looking for, especially in this new fast changing market. Having a good Leadership sense is essential for the success of a company and for its collaborative working environment. Leadership is usually linked with sustained learning, success, diversity, capacity and maintaining a continuous development of other team members and coworkers. However, various authors are debating and discussing how we define good and sustainable leadership and what we expect from a leader to do, but few of them are raising the question how we can build and create leaders?. We present in this paper an overview of leadership definition and the challenges set by this important and complex concept. We propose a vision based on four pillars to create an adequate environment to build leaders. We present and describe our perspective on what we need to provide and establish as a company or a community in order to create an effective team of leaders in the perspective of the new requirements of the market and the expectations of companies.

The present article reports the applications of Caputo-Fabrizio time-fractional derivatives. This article generalizes the idea of unsteady MHD free convective flow in a Walters.-B fluid with heat and mass transfer study over an exponential isothermal vertical plate embedded in a porous medium. The governing equations are converted into dimensionless form and extended to fractional model. The generalized Walters-B fluid model has been solved analytically using the Laplace transform technique. From the general solutions we reduce limiting solutions when to the similar motion for Newtonian fluid. The corresponding expressions for and Nusselt and Sherwood numbers are also assessed. Numerical results for velocity, temperature and concentration are demonstrated graphically for various factors of interest and discussed. As a result, we have plotted the influence of fractional parameter on fluid flow and drawn comparison between fractional Walters’-B and fractional Newtonian fluid and found that fractional Newtonian fluid is faster than fractional Walters’-B fluids.