It has become commonplace to describe publicly provided infrastructure as being in a sorry state and to advance public-private partnership as a possible remedy. This essay adopts a skeptical but not a cynical posture toward those claims. The paper starts by reviewing the comparative properties of markets and politics within a theory of budgeting where the options are construction and maintenance. This analytical point of departure explains how incongruities between political and market action can favor construction over maintenance. In short, political entities can engage in an implicit form of public debt by reducing maintenance spending to support other budgetary items. This implicit form of public debt does not manifest in higher interest rates but rather manifests in crumbling bridges and other infrastructure due to the transfer of maintenance into other budgetary activities.

The wealth of nations depends on the quality of their infrastructure. Often, however, infrastructure suffers from ineffective investments and poor maintenance. Proposed solutions, such as New Public Management or Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) tend to develop into Politicians-Private Partnerships as politicians collude with private firms to exploit present and future tax-payers. Therefore, it is necessary to give citizens better control over collective decision making. While there is a significant economic literature on empowering citizens via decentralization and direct democratic institutions, the role of electoral rules has thus far been rather neglected. An interesting case in point is Switzerland, which is well known for its high-quality infrastructure, extensive decentralization, and direct democracy. However, this paper argues that there is an additional and previously neglected institution that moves Swiss politicians away from client politics towards better serving public interest: Switzerland’s unique electoral institutions which effectively combine proportional elections with multi-seat majority elections. We explain how these institutions work, how they enhance the relationships between citizens and public and private entities, and we argue that they could be implemented in other countries.

We investigate the impact on intertemporal distribution caused by a change of policy from tax to deficit financing of public investment, using a simple theoretical framework which combines the one-period McGuire-Olson economy with the conventional long-run Solow economy. This theoretical framework provides a simple way to highlight some significant interdependencies between private and public investments as well as the negative impact of taxation on aggregate productivity, and to trace some possible transmission mechanisms between deficit financing policies and the long-run path of consumption per head. The main tentative (theoretical) result is that although under fairly acceptable assumptions the likely impact of a deficit financing policy is to benefit the present at the expense of the future, under equally acceptable assumptions concerning the possibility of an excessive macro private saving–investment propensity, and/or of a significant productivity loss due to the excess burden of taxation, the adverse intertemporal distributional impact of deficit financing might become negligible, or even disappear altogether.

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are mostly presented as a means to introduce efficient procurement methods and better value for money to taxpayers. However, the complexity of the PPP mechanism, their lack of transparency, accounting rules and implicit liabilities make it often impossible to perceive the amount of public expenditure involved and the long-run impact on taxpayers, providing room for fiscal illusion, i.e., the illusion that PPPs are much less expensive than traditional public investments. This psaper, thanks to a systematic review of the literature on the EU countries experience, tries to unveil the sources of this illusion by looking at the reasons behind the PPPs’ choice, their real costs, and the sources of fiscal risks. The literature suggests that PPPs are more costly than public funding, especially when contingent liabilities are not taken into account, and are employed as mechanisms to circumvent budgetary restrictions and to spend off-balance. The paper concludes that the public sector should share more risks with private sectors by reducing the amount of guarantees, and should prevent governments from operating through a sleight of hand that deflects attention away from off-balance financing, by applying a neutral fiscal recording system.

The present article reports the applications of Caputo-Fabrizio time-fractional derivatives. This article generalizes the idea of unsteady MHD free convective flow in a Walters.-B fluid with heat and mass transfer study over an exponential isothermal vertical plate embedded in a porous medium. The governing equations are converted into dimensionless form and extended to fractional model. The generalized Walters-B fluid model has been solved analytically using the Laplace transform technique. From the general solutions we reduce limiting solutions when to the similar motion for Newtonian fluid. The corresponding expressions for and Nusselt and Sherwood numbers are also assessed. Numerical results for velocity, temperature and concentration are demonstrated graphically for various factors of interest and discussed. As a result, we have plotted the influence of fractional parameter on fluid flow and drawn comparison between fractional Walters’-B and fractional Newtonian fluid and found that fractional Newtonian fluid is faster than fractional Walters’-B fluids.

The cambucizeiro (Campomanesia phaea), belonging to the Myrtaceae family, is a native plant of the Brazilian Atlantic Forest. The description of the characteristics of the cambucizeiro fruits is important to support new genetic improvement works and its commercial exploitation, especially regarding the processing of the fruit. The present work aimed to perform the morphological and chemical characterization of the cambucizeiro fruits. Fifty-eight accessions, from different locations in the Atlantic Forest and Serra do Mar in the state of São Paulo, were collected, propagated by seeds and one specimen of each accessory is at the Seedling Production Center in São Bento do Sapucaí (SP). Forty fruits from each access were collected in May and submitted to the following analyses: longitudinal and transversal diameter, total fruit fresh mass, number and mass of seeds, total soluble solids, % citric acid, ratio, firmness, vitamin C and coloration. Fruit conformation varies intensely among accessions. The number of seeds is not a good indicator for the relation with the fruit mass, but the mass of one thousand seeds. Some accessions have high soluble solids content, but, on the other hand, the vast majority have fruits with high acidity. Cambuci is an excellent source of vitamin C. The fruits of the accessions are green in color, persisting an opaque shade when ripe.