Black Death is a virosis caused by the Tomato Spotted Wilt Virus (TSWV), transmitted by thrips, and represents a complex problem since weed hosts for thrips vectors and the virus is accentuated as virus reservoir and vector sustenance. The objective was to generate, from a list of weeds that act as hosts for the four vector thrips species in the horticultural belt of La Plata, a relative risk categorization as an epidemiological component. Between 2000 and 2003, three sites were selected within the horticultural belt of La Plata (Buenos Aires, Argentina) where flowers of 21 weed hosts of Frankliniella occidentalis, Frankliniella schultzei, Frankliniella gemina and Thrips tabaci were sampled monthly (60 in total). For analysis, the sampling results were grouped into three annual seasons, corresponding to the phenology of greenhouse crops in the region. For the four thrips vectors, the abundance of adult thrips and the presence of their larvae were considered using an unsupervised hierarchical cluster analysis and the DGC multivariate mean comparison test to obtain the number of significant groups. From this base grouping, three risk groups (RG) were defined as a source of inoculum for these vectors: high (H), medium (M) and low (L) according to the status of the reproductive host (RH). The groups that emerged were: (H): RH of F occidentalis, (M): RH of F. schultzei and T. tabaci, and (L): RH of F. gemina or non-vector thrips. Periodic survey and early flowering suppression of nine weed species categorized as high risk is proposed. This implies the continuous monitoring of three weed species, to which other companion weeds are added according to the growing season.

Flood risk analysis is the instrument by which floodplain and stormwater utility managers create strategic adaptation plans to reduce the likelihood of flood damages in their communities, but there is a need to develop a screening tool to analyze watersheds and identify areas that should be targeted and prioritized for mitigation measures. The authors developed a screening tool that combines readily available data on topography, groundwater, surface water, tidal information for coastal communities, soils, land use, and precipitation data. Using the outputs of the screening tool for various design storms, a means to identify and prioritize improvements to be funded with scarce capital funds was developed, which combines the likelihood of flooding from the screening tool with a consequence of flooding assessment based on land use and parcel size. This framework appears to be viable across cities that may be inundated with water due to sea-level rise, rainfall, runoff upstream, and other natural events. The framework was applied to two communities using the 1-day 100-year storm event: one in southeast Broward County with an existing capital plan and one inland community with no capital plan.

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) can be an effective way of delivering infrastructure. However, achieving value for money can be difficult if government agencies are not equipped to manage them effectively. Experience from OECD countries shows that the availability of finance is not the main obstacle in delivering infrastructure. Governance—effective decision-making—is the most influential aspect on the quality of an investment, including PPP investments. In 2012, the OECD together with its member countries developed principles to ensure that PPPs deliver value for money transparently and prudently, supported by the right institutional capacities and processes to harness the upside of PPPs without jeopardizing fiscal sustainability. Survey results from OECD countries show that some dimensions of the recommended practices are well applied and past and ongoing reforms show progress. However, other principles have not been well implemented, reflecting the continuing need for improving public governance of PPPs across countries.

There is a large literature on public-private-partnership, covering many different areas and aspects. This article deals with a specific but important aspect: the decision-making mechanisms to choose the management of PPP enterprises. In this sector, a suitable choice of managers is of particular importance because the persons chosen must balance the public and private interests. This is often difficult to achieve. Two new procedures are discussed, “Directed Random Choice” and “Rotating CEOs”. In each case, the advantages and disadvantages of the procedure of choosing the managers of PPP enterprises are discussed and evaluated. It is concluded that the two novel mechanisms should be seriously considered when choosing the managers of PPP enterprises.

Starting from the ‘90s, there has been a significant increase in PPP use in the public sector in Europe, benefiting the implementation of infrastructure projects. In Italy, PPP is still much more limited than in such countries as the UK and France: the projects funded are smaller and the sectors involved are less appropriate. Based on the economic literature, European initiatives and international comparisons, the paper examines aspects of regulations that could encourage the appropriate use of PPP and considers the problems with the Italian regulations, while proposing some corrective measures. The main limitations involve: i) the absence of adequate preliminary assessments about the advantages of using PPP rather than the traditional procurement, ii) the relative lack of attention to the contract terms, iii) inadequate safeguards to ensure the bankability of the projects, and iv) limited information transparency and accessibility.

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are mostly presented as a means to introduce efficient procurement methods and better value for money to taxpayers. However, the complexity of the PPP mechanism, their lack of transparency, accounting rules and implicit liabilities make it often impossible to perceive the amount of public expenditure involved and the long-run impact on taxpayers, providing room for fiscal illusion, i.e., the illusion that PPPs are much less expensive than traditional public investments. This psaper, thanks to a systematic review of the literature on the EU countries experience, tries to unveil the sources of this illusion by looking at the reasons behind the PPPs’ choice, their real costs, and the sources of fiscal risks. The literature suggests that PPPs are more costly than public funding, especially when contingent liabilities are not taken into account, and are employed as mechanisms to circumvent budgetary restrictions and to spend off-balance. The paper concludes that the public sector should share more risks with private sectors by reducing the amount of guarantees, and should prevent governments from operating through a sleight of hand that deflects attention away from off-balance financing, by applying a neutral fiscal recording system.