The study builds on Deborah Stone’s foundational work exploring the mechanics of causal narratives and their implications for framing problems, assigning responsibility, and guiding policy solutions. The purpose of this research is to unravel the complexities of causal narratives in contemporary politics and understand their profound influence on public policy and society at large. In the digital age, where information is abundant and the traditional gatekeeping role of media has diminished, causal narratives have become increasingly multifaceted. The study aims to explore how these narratives, influenced by the intersections of natural phenomena, human actions, politics, risk, and media, shape public understanding and policy directions. The study employs an extensive review of existing literature, covering works from political science, media studies, and public policy. This includes analyzing seminal texts like Deborah Stone’s “Policy Paradox” and recent studies on media’s evolving role in political discourse. Today’s causal narratives are multifaceted, influenced by a myriad of factors including political agendas, scientific findings, and media portrayals. In conclusion, the research highlights the dynamic nature of causal narratives in the digital age and their significant impact on public policy and societal outcomes. It underscores the need for nuanced understanding and strategic approaches in crafting and interpreting these narratives.

This paper uses Public Choice analysis to examine the case for and experience with Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). A PPP is a contractual platform which connects a governmental body and a private entity. The goal is to provide a public sector program, service, or asset that would normally be provided exclusively by a public sector entity. This paper focuses on PPPs in developed countries, but it also draws on studies of PPPs in developing countries. The economics literature generally defines PPPs as long-term contractual arrangements between a public authority (local or central government) and a private supplier for the delivery of services. The private sector supplier takes responsibility for building infrastructure components, securing financing of the investment, and then managing and maintaining this facility.

However, in addition to those formed through contracts, PPPs may take other forms such as those developed in response to tax subvention or coercion, as in the case of regulatory mandates. A key element of PPP is that the private partner takes on a significant portion of the risk through a schedule of specified remuneration, contingency payments, and provision for dispute resolution. PPPs typically are long-term arrangements and involve large corporations on the private side, but may also be limited to specific phases of a project.

The types of PPPs discussed in this paper exclude arrangements which may result from government mandates such as the statutory emission mandates imposed on automobile manufacturers and industrial facilities (e.g., power plants). It also excludes PPP-like organizations resulting from US section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides tax subsidies for certain public charities, scientific research organizations, and organizations whose goals are to prevent cruelty to animals or erect public monuments at no expense to the government. This paper concludes that an array of Public Choice tools are applicable to understanding the emergence, success, or failure of PPPs. Several short case studies are provided to illustrate the practicalities of PPPs. 

Infrastructure development is critical for sustaining Asia’s economic growth. Unfortunately, huge financing gaps—estimated by a recent Asian Development Bank study to be USD22.5 trillion—constrain the ability of most emerging Asian countries to fully realize the benefits of infrastructure development. For instance, over 70% of infrastructure investments in Asia are still funded by public resources, which pose acute financing challenges for many countries with limited budgets and fiscal constraints. This paper discusses some of the challenges associated with public financing of infrastructure projects in emerging Asian countries, before introducing some new options for alleviating their infrastructure investment needs. In particular, it proposes a new approach to infrastructure financing by utilizing the spillover effects of infrastructure investment, where additional revenues generated from such investment can be channeled back to investors as subsidy to increase the returns to their investment. The paper also argues the need for Asian countries to implement fiscal reforms and to develop a more balanced approach to financing, one that involves both the private and public sector. 

It has become commonplace to describe publicly provided infrastructure as being in a sorry state and to advance public-private partnership as a possible remedy. This essay adopts a skeptical but not a cynical posture toward those claims. The paper starts by reviewing the comparative properties of markets and politics within a theory of budgeting where the options are construction and maintenance. This analytical point of departure explains how incongruities between political and market action can favor construction over maintenance. In short, political entities can engage in an implicit form of public debt by reducing maintenance spending to support other budgetary items. This implicit form of public debt does not manifest in higher interest rates but rather manifests in crumbling bridges and other infrastructure due to the transfer of maintenance into other budgetary activities.

Diabetic retinopathy (DR) is a major cause of blindness globally. Effective screening programs are essential to mitigate this burden. This review outlines key principles and practices in implementing DR screening programs, emphasizing the roles of technology, patient education, and healthcare system integration. Our analysis highlights key principles for establishing successful screening initiatives, including the importance of regular screenings, optimal intervals, recommended technologies, and necessary infrastructure. We emphasize the roles of healthcare providers, patients, and policymakers in ensuring the effectiveness of these programs. Our recommendations aim to support the creation of robust policies that mitigate the impact of DR, ultimately improving public health outcomes and reducing the incidence of blindness due to diabetic retinopathy.

In many cases, the expected efficiency advantages of public-private partnership (PPP) projects as a specific form of infrastructure provision did not materialize ex post. From a Public Choice perspective, one simple explanation for many of the problems surrounded by the governance of PPPs is that the public decision-makers being involved in the process of initiating and implementing PPP projects (namely, politicians and public bureaucrats) in many situations make low- cost decisions in the sense of Kirchgässner (1948–2017). That is, their decisions may have a high impact on the wealth of the jurisdiction in which the PPP is located (most notably, on the welfare of citizen-taxpayers in this jurisdiction) but, at the same time, these decisions often only have a low impact on the private welfare of the individual decision-makers in politics and bureaucracy. The latter, for example, in many settings often have a low economic incentive to monitor/control what the private-sector partners are doing (or not doing) within a PPP arrangement. The purpose of this paper is to draw greater attention to the problems created by low-cost decisions for the governance of PPPs. Moreover, the paper discusses potential remedies arising from the viewpoint of Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy.