This paper aims to explore the relationship between corporate overinvestment and management incentives, focusing particularly on the influence of different ownership structures. Utilizing agency theory and ownership structure theory, this study constructs a theoretical framework and posits hypotheses on how management incentives might influence corporate overinvestment behaviors under different ownership structures. Listed companies from 2010 to 2020 were selected as the research sample, and the hypotheses were empirically tested using descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, and regression analysis. The findings suggest that a relatively concentrated ownership structure may encourage management to adopt more cautious investment strategies, thus reducing overinvestment behaviors; while under a dispersed ownership structure, the relationship between management incentives and overinvestment is more complex. This study provides new evidence on how management incentive mechanisms influence corporate decision-making in different ownership environments, offering significant theoretical and practical implications for improving internal control and incentive mechanisms.

This study aims to determine the level of satisfaction of business actors with halal certification services by the Halal Product Assurance Organizing Agency (BPJPH), the only Indonesian government-owned agency for halal certification. This study uses a mixed method (quantitative-qualitative), with data collected using questionnaires involving 2367 respondents. The overall quality of certification services was evaluated using key dimensions from the perspective of the Service Quality Model (SERVQUAL), such as (1) certification requirements, (2) information and procedures, (3) completion time, (4) costs/tariffs, (5) service products, (6) competencies of executors, (7) executor behavior, (8) complaint handling, and (9) suggestions and inputs. Data were analyzed using descriptive analysis and the analysis of the weighted average of each dimension of satisfaction with the quality of public services. This study revealed that the overall satisfaction level of business actors was 84.86 (0–100). Among the nine indicators measured, eight fall within the “good” category (above 80.19); one indicator, i.e., the processing time of halal certification, was rated unsatisfactory (76.45); and none was classified as “very good.” The service gap between business actors’ expectations and BPJPH’s service delivery indicates the need to improve halal certification services. These include improvement in completion time, the executive’s behavior, costs, infrastructure, and information and procedures to streamline the certification process. The application of the SERVQUAL model in assessing halal certification standards in this study highlights the specific dimensions of service quality and the performance gaps, suggesting the need for continuous improvement to meet customer expectations effectively. This study examines halal certification services from BPJPH based on inputs from a large sample of Indonesian companies.

This research aims to assess the impact of bargaining power on budget implementation while also considering the deviation in capital expenditure as a moderating factor. The research sample included 34 provincial governments in Indonesia between 2019 and 2022. The sample determination method used purposive sampling, so the final sample size was 134 observations. The research employed panel data regression to test the hypotheses and continued with the Chow, Lagrange multiplier, and Hausman tests. The study results indicate that bargaining power has a positive and significant effect on budget implementation, with the deviation in capital expenditure not diminishing its impact. The research’s practical implication is that regional governments must effectively manage their revenues to finance regional spending needs through regional tax intensification and extensification policies. The study contributes to signaling theory by highlighting that regional governments can finance regional spending needs through fiscal independence and society’s involvement. It also contributes to agency theory by demonstrating that capital expenditure deviation in the form of information asymmetry in regional governments does not reduce their ability to finance regional expenditure needs. Nonetheless, the study suggests that the proxies used in this research are limited, and further exploration of other proxies to measure tested variables. This research provides new knowledge for stakeholders regarding the dynamics of regional budgeting, especially regarding assessing the impact of bargaining power on budget implementation and considering deviations in capital expenditure as a moderating factor.