China’s economic structure has made subtle changes with the development of digital economy. Along with the marginal diminishing effect of Chinese monetary policies and the increase of the overall leverage ratio, the Chinese economic growth mode of relying on real estate, trade and infrastructure construction in the past will not be sustainable in the next decade. This paper makes a theoretical analysis on the reduction of the search cost in digital economy. Also, this paper used empirical methods to study the relationship between China’s economic growth and digital infrastructure construction. In conclusion, the digital economy has reduced the search cost for people, and big data will become a product factor participating in labor distribution. In addition, this paper proposes for the first time that digital economy can effectively restrain inflation. The Chinese government needs to attach importance to the issue that current internet enterprise oligarchs will probably monopolize the usage of big data in the development of digital economy in the future and become the obstacle to effective economic growth. In addition, close attention should be paid to the vulnerabilities of financial and taxation systems for digital economic entities to avoid continuous disguised tax subsidies to internet oligarchs, thus preventing industrial monopoly.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) wants to become a key regional actor in the Arctic. PRC's underlying priority in the region is gaining access to commercial opportunities from trade and natural resources. To this end, PRC is building its domestic capacities for research and commercial development in the Arctic, increasing its involvement in multilateral forums on Arctic governance and deepening ties to Arctic nations, especially Russia.

Attitudes towards PRC among Arctic nations are diverging, but Beijing generally faces high levels of skepticism and opposition to its Arctic involvement, explicitly grounded in perceptions of PRC as a state undermining the rules-based international order and potential military build-up in the high north.

The analytical framework in this article builds on an outline authored by Exner-Pirot in 2012 (Exner-Pirot, 2012) to detail the current schools of thought within Arctic governance, and builds on it by including more recent developments in Arctic governance, incorporating the updated Arctic policies of most Arctic countries and connecting it to PRC.

This article contends that Beijing wants to change the status quo of Arctic governance and shift it towards a more accommodating approach to non-Arctic states. This article finds, based on the stated Arctic strategies of the eight Arctic states and PRC, that there are different views on Arctic governance where Arctic countries for the most part indicate an openness to a Chinese entry into the Arctic, albeit in diverging ways. This creates a complex governance scenario for PRC to navigate as it seeks to become a key Arctic player

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has been one of the most prominent components of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Most of the discussion on CPEC has centered around the macroeconomic effects on the economy. However, research on the fine details of CPEC’s financing structure has not been conducted. This paper aims to fill the gap by providing a detailed description of the financing of CPEC and how the money maps on to different sectors of the Pakistani economy. We also discuss some macroeconomic concerns and ways to mitigate these risks.

This paper provides a comparative perspective on infrastructure provision in developing Asia's three largest countries: China, India, and Indonesia. It discusses their achievements and shortfalls in providing network infrastructure (energy, transport, water, and telecommunications) over the past two decades. It documents how three quite distinct development paths—and very different levels of national saving and investment—were manifested in different trajectories of infrastructure provision. The paper then describes the institutional, economic, and policy factors that enabled or hindered progress in providing infrastructure. Here, contrasting levels of centralization of planning played a key role, as did countries’ differing abilities to mobilize infrastructure-related revenue streams such as user charges and land value capture. The paper then assesses future challenges for the three countries in providing infrastructure in a more integrated and sustainable way, and links these challenges with the global development agenda to which the three countries have committed. The concluding recommendations hope to provide a platform for further policy and research dialogue.