We investigate the impact on intertemporal distribution caused by a change of policy from tax to deficit financing of public investment, using a simple theoretical framework which combines the one-period McGuire-Olson economy with the conventional long-run Solow economy. This theoretical framework provides a simple way to highlight some significant interdependencies between private and public investments as well as the negative impact of taxation on aggregate productivity, and to trace some possible transmission mechanisms between deficit financing policies and the long-run path of consumption per head. The main tentative (theoretical) result is that although under fairly acceptable assumptions the likely impact of a deficit financing policy is to benefit the present at the expense of the future, under equally acceptable assumptions concerning the possibility of an excessive macro private saving–investment propensity, and/or of a significant productivity loss due to the excess burden of taxation, the adverse intertemporal distributional impact of deficit financing might become negligible, or even disappear altogether.

The project finance scenario has changed significantly around the world after the 2008 financial crisis and following the subsequent Basel III recommendations. Project finance loans from commercial banks and financial institutions have largely dried up, leaving it mostly to the export credit agencies and the bilateral and multilateral development banks to provide the institutional credit. Unfortunately, those sources are not enough, given the huge needs for construction of new infrastructure and renovation of the old ones across Asia, Africa and Latin America. The need for capital markets, through market listed financial products across asset class, unlocking a large part of domestic and corporate savings, has never been felt as strongly before. This article seeks to analyze the development story of various Asian capital markets and examine financial products, which have succeeded in their short history in receiving investor interest. The article also delves into the challenges to market development, policy imperatives and the issues relating to market liquidity and credit rating, which are the most significant influencers for public market float and investor interest.

The paper examines the motivations, financing, expansion and challenges of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI was initially designed to address China’s overcapacity and promote economic growth in both China and in countries along the “Belt” and “Road” through infrastructure investment and industrial capacity cooperation. It took into account China’s strategic transition in its opening-up policy and foreign policy to pay more attention to the neighboring countries in Southeast Asia and Central and West Asia when facing greater strategic pressure from the United States in East Asia and the Pacific region. More themes have been added to the initiative’s original framework since its inception in 2013, including the vision of the BRI as China’s major solution to improve international economic cooperation and practice to build a “community of shared future for mankind”, and the idea of the Green Silk Road and the Digital Silk Road. Chinese state-owned enterprises and policy and commercial banks have dominated investment and financing for BRI projects, which explains the root of the problems and risks facing the initiative, such as unsustainable debt, non-transparency, corruption and low economic efficiency. Measures taken by China to tackle these problems, for example, mitigating the debt distress and improving debt sustainability, are unlikely to make a big difference anytime soon due to the tenacity of China’s long-held state-driven investment model.

Cross-border infrastructure projects offer significant economic and social benefits for the Asia-Pacific region. If the required investment of $8 trillion in pan-Asian connectivity was made in the region’s infrastructure during 2010–2020, the total net income gains for developing Asia could reach about $12.98 trillion (in 2008 US dollars) during 2010–2020 and beyond, of which more than $4.43 trillion would be gained during 2010–2020 and nearly $8.55 trillion after 2020. Indeed, infrastructure connectivity helps improve regional productivity and competitiveness by facilitating the movement of goods, services and human resources, producing economies of scale, promoting trade and foreign direct investments, creating new business opportunities, stimulating inclusive industrialization and narrowing development gaps between communities, countries or sub-regions. Unfortunately, due to limited financing, progress in the development of cross-border infrastructure in the region is low.

This paper examines the key challenges faced in financing cross-border projects and discusses the roles that different stakeholders—national governments, state-owned enterprises, private sector, regional entities, development financing institutions (DFIs), affected people and civil society organizations—can play in facilitating the development of cross-border infrastructure in the region. In particular, this paper highlights the major risks that deter private sector investments and FDIs and provides recommendations to address these risks.

This paper proposes a floating-interest-rate infrastructure bond, where the interest of a government bond is paid to investors during the period of construction and the early period of operation. Unlike the usual government bond, which provides a fixed interest rate, the proposed floating-interest-rate infrastructure bond pays a floating interest, the rate of which depends on spillover tax revenues. Effective infrastructure projects have a positive effect on the economic growth of a region, known as the spillover effect. When user charges and the return from spillover tax revenues are below the fixed rate of the government bond, the interest rate will equal to the fixed rate of the government bond. In this case, investors in the infrastructure will receive interest on the government bond at the minimum rate. As the spillover effect of the infrastructure increases, the rate of return for infrastructure investment will become greater than the fixed rate of the government bond. The success of the floating-interest-rate infrastructure bond depends on the spillover effect and on transparency and accountability. Policy recommendations are provided in this paper on how to increase the spillover effect and improve transparency and accountability.