In many cases, the expected efficiency advantages of public-private partnership (PPP) projects as a specific form of infrastructure provision did not materialize ex post. From a Public Choice perspective, one simple explanation for many of the problems surrounded by the governance of PPPs is that the public decision-makers being involved in the process of initiating and implementing PPP projects (namely, politicians and public bureaucrats) in many situations make low- cost decisions in the sense of Kirchgässner (1948–2017). That is, their decisions may have a high impact on the wealth of the jurisdiction in which the PPP is located (most notably, on the welfare of citizen-taxpayers in this jurisdiction) but, at the same time, these decisions often only have a low impact on the private welfare of the individual decision-makers in politics and bureaucracy. The latter, for example, in many settings often have a low economic incentive to monitor/control what the private-sector partners are doing (or not doing) within a PPP arrangement. The purpose of this paper is to draw greater attention to the problems created by low-cost decisions for the governance of PPPs. Moreover, the paper discusses potential remedies arising from the viewpoint of Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy.

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are mostly presented as a means to introduce efficient procurement methods and better value for money to taxpayers. However, the complexity of the PPP mechanism, their lack of transparency, accounting rules and implicit liabilities make it often impossible to perceive the amount of public expenditure involved and the long-run impact on taxpayers, providing room for fiscal illusion, i.e., the illusion that PPPs are much less expensive than traditional public investments. This psaper, thanks to a systematic review of the literature on the EU countries experience, tries to unveil the sources of this illusion by looking at the reasons behind the PPPs’ choice, their real costs, and the sources of fiscal risks. The literature suggests that PPPs are more costly than public funding, especially when contingent liabilities are not taken into account, and are employed as mechanisms to circumvent budgetary restrictions and to spend off-balance. The paper concludes that the public sector should share more risks with private sectors by reducing the amount of guarantees, and should prevent governments from operating through a sleight of hand that deflects attention away from off-balance financing, by applying a neutral fiscal recording system.

There are several methods in the literature to find the fuzzy optimal solution of fully fuzzy linear programming (FFLP) problems. However, in all these methods, it is assumed that the product of two trapezoidal (triangular) fuzzy numbers will also be a trapezoidal (triangular) fuzzy number. Fan et al. (“Generalized fuzzy linear programming for decision making under uncertainty: Feasibility of fuzzy solutions and solving approach”, Information Sciences, Vol. 241, pp. 12–27, 2013) proposed a method for finding the fuzzy optimal solution of FFLP problems without considering this assumption. In this paper, it is shown that the method proposed by Fan et al. (2013) suffer from errors and to overcome these errors, a new method (named as Mehar method) is proposed for solving FFLP problems by modifying the method proposed by Fan et al. (2013) . To illustrate the proposed method, some numerical problems are solved.

Some developmental projects are created by people-private partnerships (PPP), particularly where recovery is acquirable by levying the users. Such PPPs are successful for construction of roads, bridges, running toilet facilities and conveyance facility in mode of use and pay. Likewise, public-scientist partnerships (PSPs) will be successful, where monitored impacts can be used to derive benefit. But such example cases are not so popular in utilizing new research results and derive benefits from natural resources and enhance productivity. There is a demand for similar partnership projects in research area. In this study modality of the PSP to create boost engine for natural resource conservation and bring economic prosperity is established. A novel PSP launch was synthesized on useful food crop viz. finger millet (Elusiane corcona (l)), which has been known since long past, and now is regaining popularity. It was possible to enhance additional annual production of 5.755 million tonnes of finger millet grain, equivalent to additional income of Rs 11,510 crores. Against this the scientist partnership share was 0.49x million tonnes grain and economic equivalency of Rs 992 crores, which was just 7–8%, with same level of input in agriculture. Additional benefits were sustainability of production and resources consecration, reduction of greenhouse gas emission (GHGs), particularly nitrous oxide (N₂O), largely emanating from agriculture and responsible for depletion of ozone layer. The finger millet stiff stem will be useable for production of ply-board filling material that will be innovative building material for housing and infrastructure developments and making furniture.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) hopes to deliver trillions of dollars in infrastructure financing to Asia, Europe, and Africa. If the initiative follows Chinese practices to date for infrastructure financing, which often entail lending to sovereign borrowers, then BRI raises the risk of debt distress in some borrower countries. This paper assesses the likelihood of debt problems in the 68 countries identified as potential BRI borrowers. We conclude that eight countries are at particular risk of debt distress based on an identified pipeline of project lending associated with BRI.

Because this indebtedness also suggests a higher concentration in debt owed to official and quasi-official Chinese creditors, we examine Chinese policies and practices related to sustainable financing and the management of debt problems in borrower countries. Based on this evidence, we offer recommendations to improve Chinese policy in these areas. The recommendations are offered to Chinese policymakers directly, as well as to BRI’s bilateral and multilateral partners, including the IMF and World Bank.