Developing Asia’s infrastructure gap results from both inadequate public resources and a lack of effective channels to mobilize private resources toward desired outcomes. The public-private partnership (PPP) mechanism has evolved to fill the infrastructure gap. However, PPP projects are often at risk of becoming distressed, or worst, being terminated because of the long-term nature of contracts and the many different stakeholders involved. This paper applies survival-time hazard analysis to estimate how project-related, macroeconomic, and institutional factors affect the hazard rate of the projects. Empirical results show that government’s provision of guarantees, involvement of multilateral development banks, and existence of a dedicated PPP unit are important for a project’s success. Privately initiated proposals should be regulated and undergo competitive bidding to reduce the hazard rate of the project and the corresponding burden to the government. Economic growth leads to successful project outcomes. Improved legal and institutional environment can ensure PPP success.

The market demand for uniformity and productivity of commercial carrot roots has prioritized hybrid materials over open-pollinated varieties. In this sense, the objective of this work was to estimate the combining ability of carrot genitors for root productivity and resistance to leaf scorch. The experiments were conducted in Gama, DF, in the agricultural years 2012/13 and 2013/14. We evaluated 33 carrot hybrids, originated from crosses between three male-sterile populations, with 11 male-fertile S2 lines, all the genitors being of tropical origin. At 90 days after sowing, the severity of the leaf blight disease was estimated in the plots. At 100 days after sowing, harvesting was performed and root yield characters were evaluated. Analysis of variance and partial diallel analysis were performed for each year and jointly for both years. It was found that additive and non-additive genes are important in the manifestation of root yield and leaf blight resistance traits in carrot hybrids. The male-sterile parents with higher overall combining ability for root productivity are strains LM-649 and LM-650 and, among the male-fertile, strain LM-555-2-2. The best hybrids for root yield and leaf blight resistance are LM-649 × LM-555-11-1, LM-650 × LM-555-7-1 and LM-650 × LM-554-8-1.

Nanocomposites are high performance materials which reveal rare properties. Nanocomposites have an estimated annual growth rate of 25% and fastest demand to be in engineering plastics and elastomers. Their prospective is so prominent that they are valuable in numerous areas ranging from packaging to biomedical applications. In this review, the various types of matrix nanocomposites are discussed highlighting the need for these materials, their processing approaches and some recent results on structure, properties and potential applications. Perspectives include need for such future materials and other interesting applications. Being environmentally friendly, applications of nanocomposites propose new technology and business opportunities for several sectors of the aerospace, automotive, electronics and biotechnology industries.

This paper uses Public Choice analysis to examine the case for and experience with Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). A PPP is a contractual platform which connects a governmental body and a private entity. The goal is to provide a public sector program, service, or asset that would normally be provided exclusively by a public sector entity. This paper focuses on PPPs in developed countries, but it also draws on studies of PPPs in developing countries. The economics literature generally defines PPPs as long-term contractual arrangements between a public authority (local or central government) and a private supplier for the delivery of services. The private sector supplier takes responsibility for building infrastructure components, securing financing of the investment, and then managing and maintaining this facility.

However, in addition to those formed through contracts, PPPs may take other forms such as those developed in response to tax subvention or coercion, as in the case of regulatory mandates. A key element of PPP is that the private partner takes on a significant portion of the risk through a schedule of specified remuneration, contingency payments, and provision for dispute resolution. PPPs typically are long-term arrangements and involve large corporations on the private side, but may also be limited to specific phases of a project.

The types of PPPs discussed in this paper exclude arrangements which may result from government mandates such as the statutory emission mandates imposed on automobile manufacturers and industrial facilities (e.g., power plants). It also excludes PPP-like organizations resulting from US section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides tax subsidies for certain public charities, scientific research organizations, and organizations whose goals are to prevent cruelty to animals or erect public monuments at no expense to the government. This paper concludes that an array of Public Choice tools are applicable to understanding the emergence, success, or failure of PPPs. Several short case studies are provided to illustrate the practicalities of PPPs. 

It has become commonplace to describe publicly provided infrastructure as being in a sorry state and to advance public-private partnership as a possible remedy. This essay adopts a skeptical but not a cynical posture toward those claims. The paper starts by reviewing the comparative properties of markets and politics within a theory of budgeting where the options are construction and maintenance. This analytical point of departure explains how incongruities between political and market action can favor construction over maintenance. In short, political entities can engage in an implicit form of public debt by reducing maintenance spending to support other budgetary items. This implicit form of public debt does not manifest in higher interest rates but rather manifests in crumbling bridges and other infrastructure due to the transfer of maintenance into other budgetary activities.

In many cases, the expected efficiency advantages of public-private partnership (PPP) projects as a specific form of infrastructure provision did not materialize ex post. From a Public Choice perspective, one simple explanation for many of the problems surrounded by the governance of PPPs is that the public decision-makers being involved in the process of initiating and implementing PPP projects (namely, politicians and public bureaucrats) in many situations make low- cost decisions in the sense of Kirchgässner (1948–2017). That is, their decisions may have a high impact on the wealth of the jurisdiction in which the PPP is located (most notably, on the welfare of citizen-taxpayers in this jurisdiction) but, at the same time, these decisions often only have a low impact on the private welfare of the individual decision-makers in politics and bureaucracy. The latter, for example, in many settings often have a low economic incentive to monitor/control what the private-sector partners are doing (or not doing) within a PPP arrangement. The purpose of this paper is to draw greater attention to the problems created by low-cost decisions for the governance of PPPs. Moreover, the paper discusses potential remedies arising from the viewpoint of Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy.