With the development of economic globalization and integration, enterprises should survive and develop in the fierce market competition environment, need to enhance their own competitive ability, and human resources is the fundamental and key of enterprise competitiveness. In order to achieve the objectives of enterprise organization, we need to establish a sound performance appraisal system for employees and departments, and with effective incentive mechanism to fully mobilize the enthusiasm of the staff and create potential to continuously improve the performance level. The traditional staff performance appraisal method cannot meet the needs of modern enterprises, the establishment of a basic sound, with enterprise characteristics, to a full range of staff performance appraisal method as the core of the performance management system, from different levels of personnel to collect evaluation information, multi-angle, the whole perspective of the staff to conduct a comprehensive performance appraisal, comprehensively enhance the level of human resources management. This paper mainly elaborates how the enterprises implement the performance appraisal, the performance to achieve the effect and properly handle the enterprise and the staff assessment and assessment of the relationship between the performance appraisal for the enterprise staff put forward some ideas and suggestions.

Sustainable leadership matters, spreads and lasts. It is shared responsibility, that does not unduly deplete human or financial resources, and that cares for avoids exerting negative damage on the surrounding educational and community environment. In fact, sustainability does not simply mean whether something can last. It addresses how particular initiatives can be developed without compromising the development of others in the surrounding environment, now and in the future. Sustainable leadership is one of the most valued characteristics that employers and stakeholders are looking for, especially in this new fast changing market. Having a good Leadership sense is essential for the success of a company and for its collaborative working environment. Leadership is usually linked with sustained learning, success, diversity, capacity and maintaining a continuous development of other team members and coworkers. However, various authors are debating and discussing how we define good and sustainable leadership and what we expect from a leader to do, but few of them are raising the question how we can build and create leaders?. We present in this paper an overview of leadership definition and the challenges set by this important and complex concept. We propose a vision based on four pillars to create an adequate environment to build leaders. We present and describe our perspective on what we need to provide and establish as a company or a community in order to create an effective team of leaders in the perspective of the new requirements of the market and the expectations of companies.

This paper uses Public Choice analysis to examine the case for and experience with Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). A PPP is a contractual platform which connects a governmental body and a private entity. The goal is to provide a public sector program, service, or asset that would normally be provided exclusively by a public sector entity. This paper focuses on PPPs in developed countries, but it also draws on studies of PPPs in developing countries. The economics literature generally defines PPPs as long-term contractual arrangements between a public authority (local or central government) and a private supplier for the delivery of services. The private sector supplier takes responsibility for building infrastructure components, securing financing of the investment, and then managing and maintaining this facility.

However, in addition to those formed through contracts, PPPs may take other forms such as those developed in response to tax subvention or coercion, as in the case of regulatory mandates. A key element of PPP is that the private partner takes on a significant portion of the risk through a schedule of specified remuneration, contingency payments, and provision for dispute resolution. PPPs typically are long-term arrangements and involve large corporations on the private side, but may also be limited to specific phases of a project.

The types of PPPs discussed in this paper exclude arrangements which may result from government mandates such as the statutory emission mandates imposed on automobile manufacturers and industrial facilities (e.g., power plants). It also excludes PPP-like organizations resulting from US section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides tax subsidies for certain public charities, scientific research organizations, and organizations whose goals are to prevent cruelty to animals or erect public monuments at no expense to the government. This paper concludes that an array of Public Choice tools are applicable to understanding the emergence, success, or failure of PPPs. Several short case studies are provided to illustrate the practicalities of PPPs. 

It has become commonplace to describe publicly provided infrastructure as being in a sorry state and to advance public-private partnership as a possible remedy. This essay adopts a skeptical but not a cynical posture toward those claims. The paper starts by reviewing the comparative properties of markets and politics within a theory of budgeting where the options are construction and maintenance. This analytical point of departure explains how incongruities between political and market action can favor construction over maintenance. In short, political entities can engage in an implicit form of public debt by reducing maintenance spending to support other budgetary items. This implicit form of public debt does not manifest in higher interest rates but rather manifests in crumbling bridges and other infrastructure due to the transfer of maintenance into other budgetary activities.

In many cases, the expected efficiency advantages of public-private partnership (PPP) projects as a specific form of infrastructure provision did not materialize ex post. From a Public Choice perspective, one simple explanation for many of the problems surrounded by the governance of PPPs is that the public decision-makers being involved in the process of initiating and implementing PPP projects (namely, politicians and public bureaucrats) in many situations make low- cost decisions in the sense of Kirchgässner (1948–2017). That is, their decisions may have a high impact on the wealth of the jurisdiction in which the PPP is located (most notably, on the welfare of citizen-taxpayers in this jurisdiction) but, at the same time, these decisions often only have a low impact on the private welfare of the individual decision-makers in politics and bureaucracy. The latter, for example, in many settings often have a low economic incentive to monitor/control what the private-sector partners are doing (or not doing) within a PPP arrangement. The purpose of this paper is to draw greater attention to the problems created by low-cost decisions for the governance of PPPs. Moreover, the paper discusses potential remedies arising from the viewpoint of Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy.

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are mostly presented as a means to introduce efficient procurement methods and better value for money to taxpayers. However, the complexity of the PPP mechanism, their lack of transparency, accounting rules and implicit liabilities make it often impossible to perceive the amount of public expenditure involved and the long-run impact on taxpayers, providing room for fiscal illusion, i.e., the illusion that PPPs are much less expensive than traditional public investments. This psaper, thanks to a systematic review of the literature on the EU countries experience, tries to unveil the sources of this illusion by looking at the reasons behind the PPPs’ choice, their real costs, and the sources of fiscal risks. The literature suggests that PPPs are more costly than public funding, especially when contingent liabilities are not taken into account, and are employed as mechanisms to circumvent budgetary restrictions and to spend off-balance. The paper concludes that the public sector should share more risks with private sectors by reducing the amount of guarantees, and should prevent governments from operating through a sleight of hand that deflects attention away from off-balance financing, by applying a neutral fiscal recording system.