Cross-border infrastructure projects offer significant economic and social benefits for the Asia-Pacific region. If the required investment of $8 trillion in pan-Asian connectivity was made in the region’s infrastructure during 2010–2020, the total net income gains for developing Asia could reach about $12.98 trillion (in 2008 US dollars) during 2010–2020 and beyond, of which more than $4.43 trillion would be gained during 2010–2020 and nearly $8.55 trillion after 2020. Indeed, infrastructure connectivity helps improve regional productivity and competitiveness by facilitating the movement of goods, services and human resources, producing economies of scale, promoting trade and foreign direct investments, creating new business opportunities, stimulating inclusive industrialization and narrowing development gaps between communities, countries or sub-regions. Unfortunately, due to limited financing, progress in the development of cross-border infrastructure in the region is low.

This paper examines the key challenges faced in financing cross-border projects and discusses the roles that different stakeholders—national governments, state-owned enterprises, private sector, regional entities, development financing institutions (DFIs), affected people and civil society organizations—can play in facilitating the development of cross-border infrastructure in the region. In particular, this paper highlights the major risks that deter private sector investments and FDIs and provides recommendations to address these risks.

While there has been much discussion about the large infrastructure needs in Asia and the Pacific, less attention has been paid to public expenditure efficiency in infrastructure services delivery. New constructions are not the only solution, especially when governments have limited capital to invest. Globally, new infrastructure projects face delays and cost overruns, leading to an inefficient use of public resources. The root causes include the lack of transparency in project selection, the lack of project preparation, the silo approach by public entities in assessing feasibility studies, and the lack of public sector capacity to fully develop a bankable pipeline of projects. To tackle these issues, governments need a smarter investment approach and to do so, enhancing public service efficiency is very crucial. The paper suggests a “whole life cycle” (WLC) approach as the main strategic solution for the discussed issues and challenges. We expand the definition of WLC to include the entire life cycle of the infrastructure asset from need identification to its disposal. The stages comprise planning, preparation, procurement, design, construction, operation and maintenance, and disposal. This is because we believe any efficient or inefficient decision throughout such a wide life cycle influences the quality of public services. Hence, in this holistic approach, infrastructure life cycle consists of four phases: planning, preparation, procurement, and implementation. Governments could enhance public efficiency and thus improve access to finance throughout the WLC by several solutions. These are (i) preparing infrastructure master plan and pipelines and long-term budgeting during the planning phase; (ii) establishing framework and guidelines and improving governance during preparation phase; (iii) promoting standardization, transparency, open government, and contractual consistency during the procurement phase; and finally (iv) continued role of government and total asset management during the implementation phase. In addition to these phase-specific means, key WLC solutions include proper use of technology, capacity building, and private participation in general and public-private partnership (PPP) in particular.

There is a large literature on public-private-partnership, covering many different areas and aspects. This article deals with a specific but important aspect: the decision-making mechanisms to choose the management of PPP enterprises. In this sector, a suitable choice of managers is of particular importance because the persons chosen must balance the public and private interests. This is often difficult to achieve. Two new procedures are discussed, “Directed Random Choice” and “Rotating CEOs”. In each case, the advantages and disadvantages of the procedure of choosing the managers of PPP enterprises are discussed and evaluated. It is concluded that the two novel mechanisms should be seriously considered when choosing the managers of PPP enterprises.

Starting from the ‘90s, there has been a significant increase in PPP use in the public sector in Europe, benefiting the implementation of infrastructure projects. In Italy, PPP is still much more limited than in such countries as the UK and France: the projects funded are smaller and the sectors involved are less appropriate. Based on the economic literature, European initiatives and international comparisons, the paper examines aspects of regulations that could encourage the appropriate use of PPP and considers the problems with the Italian regulations, while proposing some corrective measures. The main limitations involve: i) the absence of adequate preliminary assessments about the advantages of using PPP rather than the traditional procurement, ii) the relative lack of attention to the contract terms, iii) inadequate safeguards to ensure the bankability of the projects, and iv) limited information transparency and accessibility.

In many cases, the expected efficiency advantages of public-private partnership (PPP) projects as a specific form of infrastructure provision did not materialize ex post. From a Public Choice perspective, one simple explanation for many of the problems surrounded by the governance of PPPs is that the public decision-makers being involved in the process of initiating and implementing PPP projects (namely, politicians and public bureaucrats) in many situations make low- cost decisions in the sense of Kirchgässner (1948–2017). That is, their decisions may have a high impact on the wealth of the jurisdiction in which the PPP is located (most notably, on the welfare of citizen-taxpayers in this jurisdiction) but, at the same time, these decisions often only have a low impact on the private welfare of the individual decision-makers in politics and bureaucracy. The latter, for example, in many settings often have a low economic incentive to monitor/control what the private-sector partners are doing (or not doing) within a PPP arrangement. The purpose of this paper is to draw greater attention to the problems created by low-cost decisions for the governance of PPPs. Moreover, the paper discusses potential remedies arising from the viewpoint of Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy.