With the technology advance in broadcasting arena, Malaysian Government has upgraded Free-To-Air (FTA) Television Channels from analogue to digital in the Digitalisation Initiative launched in 2019. On the other hand, most of viewers especially young generation has switched from watching television to more high-quality channels provided via digital pay television such as ASTRO, web-based television such as Unifi TV and video on demand channels such as Iflix and Netflix. At the same time, most of the younger generation are ready to accept any innovation introduced by provider. Therefore, this paper aims to identify uses and gratifications level among youth, innovation readiness among youth, relationship between uses and gratifications as well as innovation readiness as a mediating factor between uses and gratifications. This research employs quantitative approach and data was collected via purposive sampling from 14 states including Federal Territory in Malaysia involving 350 respondents. Questionnaire was created via Google Form and was distributed to all respondents via enumerators that were officially appointed in every state in Malaysia. The findings indicate that usage has a significant relationship with gratifications among users, and innovation readiness serves as a key factor that enhances users’ levels of gratification after utilizing Digital FTA.

The study examined the community-based approach to finance basic public infrastructures in residential neighborhoods. The primary objectives of the study were to determine the condition of public infrastructures, the level of community engagement, the modalities of financing and the prominent influencing factors. The study adopted convenience sampling and questionnaire survey techniques. A total of 120 questionnaires were administered to residents of selected high-income communities (HICs) and low/medium-income communities (L/MICs), out of which 48 (80%) and 52 (86.67%) were retrieved, respectively, and analyzed. The study deployed descriptive statistics of mean and standard deviation models and mean weighted score to analyze the data. The study found that the residents were satisfied with the security of the neighborhoods but deplored the state of the public potable water infrastructure in both communities. However, the residents in the HICs enjoy a better condition of road infrastructure compared with L/MICs. The residents in both communities indicated a high level of involvement in the financing of public infrastructures, with major engagement in security and waste disposal/management infrastructures. However, the HICs engaged more in road grading/maintenance, while the provision of community potable water was given as a priority by the L/MICs. The major mode of financing basic communal infrastructures is through membership levy/contribution, and prominent influencing factors are cooperation among members, fundraising and income status. Therefore, while private-sector support funds, such as from the CDAs, help in cushioning the effects of basic infrastructure decay, governments at all levels should provide an enabling environment that will motivate mutual communal relationships through integrated infrastructure policies.

In the 1960s, many East Asian Tiger countries, such as Taiwan, Malaysia, China, etc., faced unfavourable socio-economic conditions like those facing many African countries such as Rwanda. For example, in the 1960s, Singapore was classified as an undeveloped country, with its GDP per capita standing at less than $320. However, all these countries managed to reach a development level like that of Western and North American countries (such as the U.S. and Canada), within a space of less than 15 years. Today, Singapore’s GDP per capita has risen to an incredible $84,501, making it the sixth highest GDP per capita in the world. With Vision 2020, President Kagame promised that Rwanda, which he referred to as “the African lion”, would cruise faster to the middle-income country status faster than Singapore and other middle income status countries, most of which are in East-Asia in less than 20 years. Thirteen years after the introduction of Rwanda’s Vision 2020, President Kagame dashed off the Wall Street Journal and other western media which often referred to Rwanda’s economic development as “the economic tiger of Africa” in his 2013 famous statement as follows: “There is a view that development is a marathon, not a sprint. We do not agree. Development is a marathon that must be run at a sprint. In our pursuit of progress, we have, of course, looked to East Asia’s so-called “tiger” economies for inspiration. But Africa’s experience is unique, and we must now define our own destiny. So, while being described as an “African tiger” is a welcome recognition of how far Rwanda has come, perhaps it isn’t quite right. After all, our continent has its own big cat. Step forward, the new lions of Africa.”. To achieve this objective between 2000 and 2020, Rwanda’s GDP per capita needed to increase from 254.94 USD (2000) to $1240 (in 2020), and the GDP growth rate was to grow consistently between 7% and 10% for a period of 20 years (2000–2020). The objective of this article is to critically analyse how the Government of Rwanda failed to achieve its promise of achieving a middle-income status (MICS) between 2000 and 2020. In 2000 the Rwandan president Paul Kagame launched Rwanda’s Vision 2020. This was a long-term framework for Rwanda’s development in 20 (i.e., 2000–2020). The idea behind Rwanda’s leadership was to imitate whatever Singapore did to become a developed country in just 15 years after its independence in 1965. Blatantly stated, President Paul Kagame wanted to turn his country into the Singapore of Africa. The IMF states that “Vision 2020 was the longer-term socio-economic development framework that sought to transform Rwanda into a middle-income country by 2020”. There is no doubt that Rwanda has made some developmental strides through the implementation of Vision 2020 as an instrument for operationalisation for the Singaporean-modelled developmental state over the past 20 years and has succeeded in some areas. However, the Government of Rwanda has failed in many areas and has failed to achieve the prestigious MICS in 2020. Therefore, among the many gaps in the current literature that this research seeks close is to find out what were some of the accomplishments that Rwanda’s Vision 2020 was unable to achieve? Why did the Government of Rwanda fail to achieve middle-income status within 20 years? What insights can other developing countries gain from Rwanda’s Vision 2020 experience? This study is a significant contribution to the current theoretical knowledge as it sheds light on the reasons behind the Government of Rwanda’s failure to achieve middle-income country status in 2020, a topic that has been largely ignored by the Government’s documents and the media. Despite Rwanda’s Vision 2020, there has been no scientific study to date that has attempted to deal with this topic. Therefore, this study, titled “Why the Government of Rwanda failed to achieve middle-income status (MICS) in 2020” is likely the first of its kind. By addressing