Using a newly-developed data set for Portugal, we analyze the industry-level effects of infrastructure investment. Focusing on the divide between traded and non-traded industries, we find that infrastructure investments have a non-traded bias, as these shift the industry mix towards private and public services. We also find that the industries that benefit the most in relative terms are all non-traded: construction, trade, and real estate, among the private services, and education and health, among the public services. Similarly, emerging trading sectors, such as hospitality and professional services, stand to gain. The positive impacts on traded industries are too small to make a difference. These results highlight that infrastructure-based strategies are not neutral in terms of the industry mix. Moreover, with most of the benefits accruing to non-traded industries, such a development model that is heavily based on domestic demand may be unsustainable in light of Portugal’s current foreign account position. 

While there has been much discussion about the large infrastructure needs in Asia and the Pacific, less attention has been paid to public expenditure efficiency in infrastructure services delivery. New constructions are not the only solution, especially when governments have limited capital to invest. Globally, new infrastructure projects face delays and cost overruns, leading to an inefficient use of public resources. The root causes include the lack of transparency in project selection, the lack of project preparation, the silo approach by public entities in assessing feasibility studies, and the lack of public sector capacity to fully develop a bankable pipeline of projects. To tackle these issues, governments need a smarter investment approach and to do so, enhancing public service efficiency is very crucial. The paper suggests a “whole life cycle” (WLC) approach as the main strategic solution for the discussed issues and challenges. We expand the definition of WLC to include the entire life cycle of the infrastructure asset from need identification to its disposal. The stages comprise planning, preparation, procurement, design, construction, operation and maintenance, and disposal. This is because we believe any efficient or inefficient decision throughout such a wide life cycle influences the quality of public services. Hence, in this holistic approach, infrastructure life cycle consists of four phases: planning, preparation, procurement, and implementation. Governments could enhance public efficiency and thus improve access to finance throughout the WLC by several solutions. These are (i) preparing infrastructure master plan and pipelines and long-term budgeting during the planning phase; (ii) establishing framework and guidelines and improving governance during preparation phase; (iii) promoting standardization, transparency, open government, and contractual consistency during the procurement phase; and finally (iv) continued role of government and total asset management during the implementation phase. In addition to these phase-specific means, key WLC solutions include proper use of technology, capacity building, and private participation in general and public-private partnership (PPP) in particular.

Our intention in assembling this special issue of the Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development is to offer a state-of-the-art tour through the political economy issues associated with the provision of public infrastructure, and with the use of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in particular. Anyone who is familiar with PPPs cannot fail to be impressed by the diversity of positions and claims regarding their properties. Some scholars maintain that PPPs are an efficient tool to enhance productivity due to their ability to manage demand-side risk. In contrast, other scholars see in PPPs a scheme whereby the public assumes the risk while the private partner takes the profit.

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) can be an effective way of delivering infrastructure. However, achieving value for money can be difficult if government agencies are not equipped to manage them effectively. Experience from OECD countries shows that the availability of finance is not the main obstacle in delivering infrastructure. Governance—effective decision-making—is the most influential aspect on the quality of an investment, including PPP investments. In 2012, the OECD together with its member countries developed principles to ensure that PPPs deliver value for money transparently and prudently, supported by the right institutional capacities and processes to harness the upside of PPPs without jeopardizing fiscal sustainability. Survey results from OECD countries show that some dimensions of the recommended practices are well applied and past and ongoing reforms show progress. However, other principles have not been well implemented, reflecting the continuing need for improving public governance of PPPs across countries.

Starting from the ‘90s, there has been a significant increase in PPP use in the public sector in Europe, benefiting the implementation of infrastructure projects. In Italy, PPP is still much more limited than in such countries as the UK and France: the projects funded are smaller and the sectors involved are less appropriate. Based on the economic literature, European initiatives and international comparisons, the paper examines aspects of regulations that could encourage the appropriate use of PPP and considers the problems with the Italian regulations, while proposing some corrective measures. The main limitations involve: i) the absence of adequate preliminary assessments about the advantages of using PPP rather than the traditional procurement, ii) the relative lack of attention to the contract terms, iii) inadequate safeguards to ensure the bankability of the projects, and iv) limited information transparency and accessibility.

It has become commonplace to describe publicly provided infrastructure as being in a sorry state and to advance public-private partnership as a possible remedy. This essay adopts a skeptical but not a cynical posture toward those claims. The paper starts by reviewing the comparative properties of markets and politics within a theory of budgeting where the options are construction and maintenance. This analytical point of departure explains how incongruities between political and market action can favor construction over maintenance. In short, political entities can engage in an implicit form of public debt by reducing maintenance spending to support other budgetary items. This implicit form of public debt does not manifest in higher interest rates but rather manifests in crumbling bridges and other infrastructure due to the transfer of maintenance into other budgetary activities.