In this policy insight, the author lays out the context of the BRI and its role in global development. He also explains why the US should consider working with China on the BRI. The author opines on China’s possible approach and strategy to get global private investors to come on board for the massive BRI projects. He suggests that the global players can establish a third-party market cooperation and coordination mechanism to turn the BRI into a platform for win-win global collaboration.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) wants to become a key regional actor in the Arctic. PRC's underlying priority in the region is gaining access to commercial opportunities from trade and natural resources. To this end, PRC is building its domestic capacities for research and commercial development in the Arctic, increasing its involvement in multilateral forums on Arctic governance and deepening ties to Arctic nations, especially Russia.

Attitudes towards PRC among Arctic nations are diverging, but Beijing generally faces high levels of skepticism and opposition to its Arctic involvement, explicitly grounded in perceptions of PRC as a state undermining the rules-based international order and potential military build-up in the high north.

The analytical framework in this article builds on an outline authored by Exner-Pirot in 2012 (Exner-Pirot, 2012) to detail the current schools of thought within Arctic governance, and builds on it by including more recent developments in Arctic governance, incorporating the updated Arctic policies of most Arctic countries and connecting it to PRC.

This article contends that Beijing wants to change the status quo of Arctic governance and shift it towards a more accommodating approach to non-Arctic states. This article finds, based on the stated Arctic strategies of the eight Arctic states and PRC, that there are different views on Arctic governance where Arctic countries for the most part indicate an openness to a Chinese entry into the Arctic, albeit in diverging ways. This creates a complex governance scenario for PRC to navigate as it seeks to become a key Arctic player

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has been one of the most prominent components of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Most of the discussion on CPEC has centered around the macroeconomic effects on the economy. However, research on the fine details of CPEC’s financing structure has not been conducted. This paper aims to fill the gap by providing a detailed description of the financing of CPEC and how the money maps on to different sectors of the Pakistani economy. We also discuss some macroeconomic concerns and ways to mitigate these risks.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) aims to enhance connectivity and collaboration among 60 countries and beyond in Asia, Africa and Europe. Information and communications technology (ICT) is an indispensable component of the initiative, critical in providing fundamental communication channels for global financial transactions, trade exchanges and transport and energy connectivity, and socio cultural collaboration and scientific exchanges between people, organizations and countries along the BRI corridors. Previously constrained by infrastructure deficits in ICT, the Asia-Pacific region is accelerating its efforts to provide reliable and affordable broadband networks throughout the region, to contribute to successful implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG).

Within the BRI corridors, this study which has been undertaken as part of the research programme of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) on promoting regional economic cooperation and integration, focuses on the China-Central Asia Corridor (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), giving attention to the sub-region’s specific challenges, namely limited international transit opportunities and an increase in bandwidth requirements that is expected to grow exponentially, as the fourth industrial evolution centered on automation and artificial intelligence gathers momentum. The sub-region is characterized as highly dependent on the ease and costs of connecting to neighboring countries for transit, as many countries in the sub-region are landlocked developing countries (LLDC). Because of the geographical features and other factors, the development potential of Central Asia and its integration into globalization, continues to be stymied by insufficient international bandwidth and high transit costs to access international links. Therefore, improved ICT connectivity in Central Asia through the BRI corridor could result in improved availability and affordability of broadband networks and services in the sub-region.

For the purpose of this study, a gap analysis is the methodology that underpins the proposed topology for the China-Central Asia Corridor. The analysis included examining the current state of the optic infrastructure, such as existing and planned fiber-optic networks, existing Internet Exchange Points (IXPs) and international gateways. The study also identifies the key factors that determine the desired future state of infrastructure deployment for the BRI initiative. A topology that consists of connecting Almaty (Kazakhstan) and Urumqi (China), as core nodes, is proposed based on a partial mesh topology. Over and above this core finding, the study concludes that digital infrastructure connectivity has a tendency of lagging behind the rapid opportunities evolving, and the study therefore advocates for sub-regional and regional approaches, including the BRI and Asia-Pacific Information Superhighway (AP-IS) in further expanding regional broadband networks. A key recommendation of the study is co-deployment of broadband infrastructure along passive infrastructure, as an additional cost effective means of achieving fast and affordable broadband connectivity for all.

Chinese municipalities have developed a large stock of capital assets during a period of rapid growth and urbanization, but have yet to modernize asset management practices. Cities face challenges such as premature decline of fixed assets and spiking liabilities related to operating and maintaining assets. This paper evaluates the asset management practices in three selected small cities and towns in China, using a benchmarking assessment tool followed by an in-depth field assessment. The paper finds that overall performance is below half the international benchmark for good practice in all three cities. Management practices are considerably more advanced for land than for buildings and infrastructure. Key deficiencies in data availability and reporting, governance, capacity, and financial management indicate increased risks for local government finance and the delivery of public services. For small cities and towns where public revenues are often uncertain and limited, urban public services will be at risk of deterioration unless good asset management practices are put in place. The paper recommends strategic actions for upper and lower levels of government, to advance local asset management practices and facilitate the reform agenda.