In many cases, the expected efficiency advantages of public-private partnership (PPP) projects as a specific form of infrastructure provision did not materialize ex post. From a Public Choice perspective, one simple explanation for many of the problems surrounded by the governance of PPPs is that the public decision-makers being involved in the process of initiating and implementing PPP projects (namely, politicians and public bureaucrats) in many situations make low- cost decisions in the sense of Kirchgässner (1948–2017). That is, their decisions may have a high impact on the wealth of the jurisdiction in which the PPP is located (most notably, on the welfare of citizen-taxpayers in this jurisdiction) but, at the same time, these decisions often only have a low impact on the private welfare of the individual decision-makers in politics and bureaucracy. The latter, for example, in many settings often have a low economic incentive to monitor/control what the private-sector partners are doing (or not doing) within a PPP arrangement. The purpose of this paper is to draw greater attention to the problems created by low-cost decisions for the governance of PPPs. Moreover, the paper discusses potential remedies arising from the viewpoint of Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy.

We investigate the impact on intertemporal distribution caused by a change of policy from tax to deficit financing of public investment, using a simple theoretical framework which combines the one-period McGuire-Olson economy with the conventional long-run Solow economy. This theoretical framework provides a simple way to highlight some significant interdependencies between private and public investments as well as the negative impact of taxation on aggregate productivity, and to trace some possible transmission mechanisms between deficit financing policies and the long-run path of consumption per head. The main tentative (theoretical) result is that although under fairly acceptable assumptions the likely impact of a deficit financing policy is to benefit the present at the expense of the future, under equally acceptable assumptions concerning the possibility of an excessive macro private saving–investment propensity, and/or of a significant productivity loss due to the excess burden of taxation, the adverse intertemporal distributional impact of deficit financing might become negligible, or even disappear altogether.

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are mostly presented as a means to introduce efficient procurement methods and better value for money to taxpayers. However, the complexity of the PPP mechanism, their lack of transparency, accounting rules and implicit liabilities make it often impossible to perceive the amount of public expenditure involved and the long-run impact on taxpayers, providing room for fiscal illusion, i.e., the illusion that PPPs are much less expensive than traditional public investments. This psaper, thanks to a systematic review of the literature on the EU countries experience, tries to unveil the sources of this illusion by looking at the reasons behind the PPPs’ choice, their real costs, and the sources of fiscal risks. The literature suggests that PPPs are more costly than public funding, especially when contingent liabilities are not taken into account, and are employed as mechanisms to circumvent budgetary restrictions and to spend off-balance. The paper concludes that the public sector should share more risks with private sectors by reducing the amount of guarantees, and should prevent governments from operating through a sleight of hand that deflects attention away from off-balance financing, by applying a neutral fiscal recording system.

Some developmental projects are created by people-private partnerships (PPP), particularly where recovery is acquirable by levying the users. Such PPPs are successful for construction of roads, bridges, running toilet facilities and conveyance facility in mode of use and pay. Likewise, public-scientist partnerships (PSPs) will be successful, where monitored impacts can be used to derive benefit. But such example cases are not so popular in utilizing new research results and derive benefits from natural resources and enhance productivity. There is a demand for similar partnership projects in research area. In this study modality of the PSP to create boost engine for natural resource conservation and bring economic prosperity is established. A novel PSP launch was synthesized on useful food crop viz. finger millet (Elusiane corcona (l)), which has been known since long past, and now is regaining popularity. It was possible to enhance additional annual production of 5.755 million tonnes of finger millet grain, equivalent to additional income of Rs 11,510 crores. Against this the scientist partnership share was 0.49x million tonnes grain and economic equivalency of Rs 992 crores, which was just 7–8%, with same level of input in agriculture. Additional benefits were sustainability of production and resources consecration, reduction of greenhouse gas emission (GHGs), particularly nitrous oxide (N₂O), largely emanating from agriculture and responsible for depletion of ozone layer. The finger millet stiff stem will be useable for production of ply-board filling material that will be innovative building material for housing and infrastructure developments and making furniture.

Japan’s investment in the domestic construction industry has fallen to less than half its peak in 1992. Given the country’s declining population, Japanese construction companies must go global to remain profitable. To what extent the Japanese government and Japanese companies can contribute to meeting the growing infrastructure needs in the region is unclear as Japanese companies have long been operating primarily in Japan. The Japanese government has in recent years passed a series of new laws that encourage private sector participation in financing, building and operating public infrastructure. Through involvement in such public projects, Japanese companies have developed the skills and technologies to build a variety of infrastructures that are resilient to natural disasters and adaptable to various geographical conditions and social and economic development. But the major challenge for Japanese companies is to transform their business model drastically from one that relies on the domestic market to one that contributes to the social and economic development of third countries.

Embassies are important buildings, involving the diplomatic image of a country’s government in another foreign country. Given the rising tensions between countries, either political, economic, religion or war, attacks on embassies have been increasing in recent years. Thus, it is evident that appropriate measures are to be taken to reduce the potential impact of an attack. The paper discusses the measures in enhancing building security of embassies. The principles for Security Planning and Design are discussed, followed by an introduction to a systematic security risk assessment framework. The framework is evaluated regarding the potential security risk posed by an attack against elements of the mega infrastructure using explosives. Further options to increase the security of embassies are also explored to reduce the risk of a potential attack. A security-enhanced building, planned and constructed well to specifications, can provide benefits to the client, including greater cost advantage and increase of value for the structure.