In the 1960s, many East Asian Tiger countries, such as Taiwan, Malaysia, China, etc., faced unfavourable socio-economic conditions like those facing many African countries such as Rwanda. For example, in the 1960s, Singapore was classified as an undeveloped country, with its GDP per capita standing at less than $320. However, all these countries managed to reach a development level like that of Western and North American countries (such as the U.S. and Canada), within a space of less than 15 years. Today, Singapore’s GDP per capita has risen to an incredible $84,501, making it the sixth highest GDP per capita in the world. With Vision 2020, President Kagame promised that Rwanda, which he referred to as “the African lion”, would cruise faster to the middle-income country status faster than Singapore and other middle income status countries, most of which are in East-Asia in less than 20 years. Thirteen years after the introduction of Rwanda’s Vision 2020, President Kagame dashed off the Wall Street Journal and other western media which often referred to Rwanda’s economic development as “the economic tiger of Africa” in his 2013 famous statement as follows: “There is a view that development is a marathon, not a sprint. We do not agree. Development is a marathon that must be run at a sprint. In our pursuit of progress, we have, of course, looked to East Asia’s so-called “tiger” economies for inspiration. But Africa’s experience is unique, and we must now define our own destiny. So, while being described as an “African tiger” is a welcome recognition of how far Rwanda has come, perhaps it isn’t quite right. After all, our continent has its own big cat. Step forward, the new lions of Africa.”. To achieve this objective between 2000 and 2020, Rwanda’s GDP per capita needed to increase from 254.94 USD (2000) to $1240 (in 2020), and the GDP growth rate was to grow consistently between 7% and 10% for a period of 20 years (2000–2020). The objective of this article is to critically analyse how the Government of Rwanda failed to achieve its promise of achieving a middle-income status (MICS) between 2000 and 2020. In 2000 the Rwandan president Paul Kagame launched Rwanda’s Vision 2020. This was a long-term framework for Rwanda’s development in 20 (i.e., 2000–2020). The idea behind Rwanda’s leadership was to imitate whatever Singapore did to become a developed country in just 15 years after its independence in 1965. Blatantly stated, President Paul Kagame wanted to turn his country into the Singapore of Africa. The IMF states that “Vision 2020 was the longer-term socio-economic development framework that sought to transform Rwanda into a middle-income country by 2020”. There is no doubt that Rwanda has made some developmental strides through the implementation of Vision 2020 as an instrument for operationalisation for the Singaporean-modelled developmental state over the past 20 years and has succeeded in some areas. However, the Government of Rwanda has failed in many areas and has failed to achieve the prestigious MICS in 2020. Therefore, among the many gaps in the current literature that this research seeks close is to find out what were some of the accomplishments that Rwanda’s Vision 2020 was unable to achieve? Why did the Government of Rwanda fail to achieve middle-income status within 20 years? What insights can other developing countries gain from Rwanda’s Vision 2020 experience? This study is a significant contribution to the current theoretical knowledge as it sheds light on the reasons behind the Government of Rwanda’s failure to achieve middle-income country status in 2020, a topic that has been largely ignored by the Government’s documents and the media. Despite Rwanda’s Vision 2020, there has been no scientific study to date that has attempted to deal with this topic. Therefore, this study, titled “Why the Government of Rwanda failed to achieve middle-income status (MICS) in 2020” is likely the first of its kind. By addressing

Practical Learning of Artificial Intelligence on the Edge of Industry 4.0 (PLANET4) is a cross-disciplinary initiative funded by the European Commission under the Erasmus+ program that embodies the triple helix model of collaboration between academia, industry, and administration. It aims to bridge the gap between academic teaching and practical applications in the context of Industry 4.0. PLANET4 focuses on developing hard skills in artificial intelligence, industrial Internet of things, and cloud and edge computing, along with the soft competencies required to manage changes in the industrial ecosystem. It involves three phases: (1) training needs analysis, taxonomy development, and workshop design; (2) collection of best practices and training material design; and (3) implementation of the PLANET4 learning course. This paper presents the materialization of these phases into a blended learning course, highlighting the integration of the triple helix model and the European Commission’s support for academia-industry collaboration with the aim of improving education quality and promoting Industry 4.0 innovation in Europe.

Law Number 6 of 2014 concerning Villages mandates the Village Consultative Body (BPD) as a partner of the village government in empowering village communities to achieve self-governing communities. Referring to the Village Development Index (IDM) in Malang Regency, even though there are no villages classified as very underdeveloped or underdeveloped, there are still more than 61.6% (233 villages) classified as developing, while there are 33.1% (125 villages) classified as developed, and 5.3% (20 villages) are classified as independent. Departing from this phenomenon, this research aims to describe how the BPD functions are implemented in villages classified as developing in Malang Regency under the mandate of Law No. 6 of 2014. Using a qualitative approach, research data collection was carried out using depth-interview and focus group discussion (FGD) techniques. Data analysis uses the stages proposed by Cresswell. The research results indicate that the implementation of the functions and roles of BPD in the research object villages is less effective. Patronage and the low competence and capacity of the average BPD members, as a result of a less focused election process, minimal education, training, and technical guidance, and a very inadequate development budget, are the causes of the ineffective implementation of the roles and functions of BPD members. The ineffective function of the BPD breaks hopes for increased democratization and participation of village communities in efforts to achieve a self-governing community in Malang Regency.