This article explores the development and legislative process of concession agreements within the framework of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in the EU, tracing their origins to the United Kingdom in the early 1990s. Driven by national policies, the Ministry of Finance in China has promoted PPPs in infrastructure and public services. This study focuses on the basic principles, legal nature, and general rules of EU concession agreements, aiming to provide legal strategies for Chinese franchising agreement legislation by drawing on the EU’s legislative experiences.

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are mostly presented as a means to introduce efficient procurement methods and better value for money to taxpayers. However, the complexity of the PPP mechanism, their lack of transparency, accounting rules and implicit liabilities make it often impossible to perceive the amount of public expenditure involved and the long-run impact on taxpayers, providing room for fiscal illusion, i.e., the illusion that PPPs are much less expensive than traditional public investments. This psaper, thanks to a systematic review of the literature on the EU countries experience, tries to unveil the sources of this illusion by looking at the reasons behind the PPPs’ choice, their real costs, and the sources of fiscal risks. The literature suggests that PPPs are more costly than public funding, especially when contingent liabilities are not taken into account, and are employed as mechanisms to circumvent budgetary restrictions and to spend off-balance. The paper concludes that the public sector should share more risks with private sectors by reducing the amount of guarantees, and should prevent governments from operating through a sleight of hand that deflects attention away from off-balance financing, by applying a neutral fiscal recording system.