Ride-hailing or private hire has taken the Singapore transport network by storm in the past few years. Singapore has had more than three revisions of its ride-hailing regulation in the six years since the arrival of the disruptive technology. Often quoted in the list of cities with commendable public transport policy, Singapore still manages to find a viable and significant position for ride-hailing. Cities from around the world are all searching for a model of regulation for ride-hailing that can be elevated as a benchmark. Singapore, to a large extent, has formulated a successful model based on current market parameters and, more importantly, an adaptive one that evolves constantly with the constantly disruptive technology. The experts and regulators of the Singapore transport sector were interviewed in depth, tapping into their opinions and technocratic commentaries on the city-state’s Point-to-Point, or P2P, sector regulation. The data were analyzed using the three-element model of social practice theory as an alternative to conventional behavioral studies, thereby eliminating bias on the commuters and rather shifting focus to the practice. Content analysis utilizing QDA is executed for categorization through fine-level inductive matrix coding to elaborate upon the policy derivatives of the Singapore model. The unique addition of the research to ride-hailing policy is the comprehension of the commonalities and patterns across industrial and technological disruption, practice and policy irrespective of sectoral variations, thanks to the utilization of social practice theory. The first-of-its-kind policy exercise in the sector can be repeated for any city, which is a direct testament to the simplicity and exhaustivity of the methodology, benefiting both operators and investors through equitable policy formulation.

COVID-19 and the economic response have amplified and changed the nature of development challenges in fundamental ways. Global development cooperation should adapt accordingly. This paper lays out the urgency for new methods of development cooperation that can deliver resource transfers at scale, oriented to addressing climate change and with transparency and better governance. It looks at what is actually happening to major donor countries’ development cooperation programs and where the principal gaps lie, and offers some thoughts on how to move forward, notwithstanding the clear geopolitical rivalries that are evident.
The most immediate challenge is to provide a level of liquidity support to countries ravaged by the global economic downturn. Many developing countries will see double-digit declines in GDP, with some recording downturns not seen in peacetime. Alongside the short-term challenge of recovery, COVID-19 has laid bare longer-term trends that have pointed for some time to the lack of sustainability—environmental, social, and governance—in the way economic development was occurring in many places, including in advanced economies. This new landscape has significant implications for development cooperation in terms of scale, development/climate co-benefits, and transparency and accountability.

Cross-border infrastructure projects offer significant economic and social benefits for the Asia-Pacific region. If the required investment of $8 trillion in pan-Asian connectivity was made in the region’s infrastructure during 2010–2020, the total net income gains for developing Asia could reach about $12.98 trillion (in 2008 US dollars) during 2010–2020 and beyond, of which more than $4.43 trillion would be gained during 2010–2020 and nearly $8.55 trillion after 2020. Indeed, infrastructure connectivity helps improve regional productivity and competitiveness by facilitating the movement of goods, services and human resources, producing economies of scale, promoting trade and foreign direct investments, creating new business opportunities, stimulating inclusive industrialization and narrowing development gaps between communities, countries or sub-regions. Unfortunately, due to limited financing, progress in the development of cross-border infrastructure in the region is low.

This paper examines the key challenges faced in financing cross-border projects and discusses the roles that different stakeholders—national governments, state-owned enterprises, private sector, regional entities, development financing institutions (DFIs), affected people and civil society organizations—can play in facilitating the development of cross-border infrastructure in the region. In particular, this paper highlights the major risks that deter private sector investments and FDIs and provides recommendations to address these risks.

The paper examines the motivations, financing, expansion and challenges of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI was initially designed to address China’s overcapacity and promote economic growth in both China and in countries along the “Belt” and “Road” through infrastructure investment and industrial capacity cooperation. It took into account China’s strategic transition in its opening-up policy and foreign policy to pay more attention to the neighboring countries in Southeast Asia and Central and West Asia when facing greater strategic pressure from the United States in East Asia and the Pacific region. More themes have been added to the initiative’s original framework since its inception in 2013, including the vision of the BRI as China’s major solution to improve international economic cooperation and practice to build a “community of shared future for mankind”, and the idea of the Green Silk Road and the Digital Silk Road. Chinese state-owned enterprises and policy and commercial banks have dominated investment and financing for BRI projects, which explains the root of the problems and risks facing the initiative, such as unsustainable debt, non-transparency, corruption and low economic efficiency. Measures taken by China to tackle these problems, for example, mitigating the debt distress and improving debt sustainability, are unlikely to make a big difference anytime soon due to the tenacity of China’s long-held state-driven investment model.