Increasingly, U.S. cities are focusing on transit-oriented development (TOD) policies to expand the stock of higher-density, mixed-use development near public transit stations within the context of a transit corridor and, in most cases, a regional metropolis. A TOD zone relies on a regulatory and institutional environment, public and private participation and investment, and development incentives to create vibrant, people-oriented communities and mobility options and to support business development. TODs provide local governments with more tax revenues due to increased property values (and, as applicable, income and sales tax revenues), but most planning for TODs ignores the non-transit infrastructure costs of increasing development density. This study focused on determining the water and sewer infrastructure costs for TOD zones along a rail line in southeast Florida. The finding was that millions of dollars in funds are needed to meet those water and sewer needs and that few are currently planned as a part of community capital improvement programs.

COVID-19 and the economic response have amplified and changed the nature of development challenges in fundamental ways. Global development cooperation should adapt accordingly. This paper lays out the urgency for new methods of development cooperation that can deliver resource transfers at scale, oriented to addressing climate change and with transparency and better governance. It looks at what is actually happening to major donor countries’ development cooperation programs and where the principal gaps lie, and offers some thoughts on how to move forward, notwithstanding the clear geopolitical rivalries that are evident.
The most immediate challenge is to provide a level of liquidity support to countries ravaged by the global economic downturn. Many developing countries will see double-digit declines in GDP, with some recording downturns not seen in peacetime. Alongside the short-term challenge of recovery, COVID-19 has laid bare longer-term trends that have pointed for some time to the lack of sustainability—environmental, social, and governance—in the way economic development was occurring in many places, including in advanced economies. This new landscape has significant implications for development cooperation in terms of scale, development/climate co-benefits, and transparency and accountability.

The People's Republic of China (PRC) wants to become a key regional actor in the Arctic. PRC's underlying priority in the region is gaining access to commercial opportunities from trade and natural resources. To this end, PRC is building its domestic capacities for research and commercial development in the Arctic, increasing its involvement in multilateral forums on Arctic governance and deepening ties to Arctic nations, especially Russia.

Attitudes towards PRC among Arctic nations are diverging, but Beijing generally faces high levels of skepticism and opposition to its Arctic involvement, explicitly grounded in perceptions of PRC as a state undermining the rules-based international order and potential military build-up in the high north.

The analytical framework in this article builds on an outline authored by Exner-Pirot in 2012 (Exner-Pirot, 2012) to detail the current schools of thought within Arctic governance, and builds on it by including more recent developments in Arctic governance, incorporating the updated Arctic policies of most Arctic countries and connecting it to PRC.

This article contends that Beijing wants to change the status quo of Arctic governance and shift it towards a more accommodating approach to non-Arctic states. This article finds, based on the stated Arctic strategies of the eight Arctic states and PRC, that there are different views on Arctic governance where Arctic countries for the most part indicate an openness to a Chinese entry into the Arctic, albeit in diverging ways. This creates a complex governance scenario for PRC to navigate as it seeks to become a key Arctic player