The wealth of nations depends on the quality of their infrastructure. Often, however, infrastructure suffers from ineffective investments and poor maintenance. Proposed solutions, such as New Public Management or Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) tend to develop into Politicians-Private Partnerships as politicians collude with private firms to exploit present and future tax-payers. Therefore, it is necessary to give citizens better control over collective decision making. While there is a significant economic literature on empowering citizens via decentralization and direct democratic institutions, the role of electoral rules has thus far been rather neglected. An interesting case in point is Switzerland, which is well known for its high-quality infrastructure, extensive decentralization, and direct democracy. However, this paper argues that there is an additional and previously neglected institution that moves Swiss politicians away from client politics towards better serving public interest: Switzerland’s unique electoral institutions which effectively combine proportional elections with multi-seat majority elections. We explain how these institutions work, how they enhance the relationships between citizens and public and private entities, and we argue that they could be implemented in other countries.

In many cases, the expected efficiency advantages of public-private partnership (PPP) projects as a specific form of infrastructure provision did not materialize ex post. From a Public Choice perspective, one simple explanation for many of the problems surrounded by the governance of PPPs is that the public decision-makers being involved in the process of initiating and implementing PPP projects (namely, politicians and public bureaucrats) in many situations make low- cost decisions in the sense of Kirchgässner (1948–2017). That is, their decisions may have a high impact on the wealth of the jurisdiction in which the PPP is located (most notably, on the welfare of citizen-taxpayers in this jurisdiction) but, at the same time, these decisions often only have a low impact on the private welfare of the individual decision-makers in politics and bureaucracy. The latter, for example, in many settings often have a low economic incentive to monitor/control what the private-sector partners are doing (or not doing) within a PPP arrangement. The purpose of this paper is to draw greater attention to the problems created by low-cost decisions for the governance of PPPs. Moreover, the paper discusses potential remedies arising from the viewpoint of Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy.

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are mostly presented as a means to introduce efficient procurement methods and better value for money to taxpayers. However, the complexity of the PPP mechanism, their lack of transparency, accounting rules and implicit liabilities make it often impossible to perceive the amount of public expenditure involved and the long-run impact on taxpayers, providing room for fiscal illusion, i.e., the illusion that PPPs are much less expensive than traditional public investments. This psaper, thanks to a systematic review of the literature on the EU countries experience, tries to unveil the sources of this illusion by looking at the reasons behind the PPPs’ choice, their real costs, and the sources of fiscal risks. The literature suggests that PPPs are more costly than public funding, especially when contingent liabilities are not taken into account, and are employed as mechanisms to circumvent budgetary restrictions and to spend off-balance. The paper concludes that the public sector should share more risks with private sectors by reducing the amount of guarantees, and should prevent governments from operating through a sleight of hand that deflects attention away from off-balance financing, by applying a neutral fiscal recording system.

The market demand for uniformity and productivity of commercial carrot roots has prioritized hybrid materials over open-pollinated varieties. In this sense, the objective of this work was to estimate the combining ability of carrot genitors for root productivity and resistance to leaf scorch. The experiments were conducted in Gama, DF, in the agricultural years 2012/13 and 2013/14. We evaluated 33 carrot hybrids, originated from crosses between three male-sterile populations, with 11 male-fertile S2 lines, all the genitors being of tropical origin. At 90 days after sowing, the severity of the leaf blight disease was estimated in the plots. At 100 days after sowing, harvesting was performed and root yield characters were evaluated. Analysis of variance and partial diallel analysis were performed for each year and jointly for both years. It was found that additive and non-additive genes are important in the manifestation of root yield and leaf blight resistance traits in carrot hybrids. The male-sterile parents with higher overall combining ability for root productivity are strains LM-649 and LM-650 and, among the male-fertile, strain LM-555-2-2. The best hybrids for root yield and leaf blight resistance are LM-649 × LM-555-11-1, LM-650 × LM-555-7-1 and LM-650 × LM-554-8-1.

Nothofagus pumilio forests constitute the most economically important forest stand in southern Argentina and Chile. Total volume stocking and volumetric yield vary according to site quality, degree of occupation, growth stage and forest history of the stand. The objective of this work was to evaluate the stocking and the productive potential in quantity and quality of products for the sawmilling industry, using three harvesting systems (short logs, long logs and complete shafts) in the protection cut of a N. pumilio forest of site quality III in Tierra del Fuego (Argentina). The trials were conducted in an irregular mature forest with two strata and abundant regeneration (3.0 ha; RDI 93.8–113.4%). Total volumes varied between 726.5 and 850.3 m³∙ha^-1, with a volume/basal area ratio of 11.8 to 12.1 m³∙m^-2. The harvesting rates obtained were: 45.5% for complete logs, 21.3% for long logs and 22.4% for short logs. A model was used to estimate the timber volume for each system, where full shafts resulted in a significant increase in timber volume. Considering new alternatives in the planning of harvesting in forest management for N. pumilio forests, such as the system of complete shafts, allows obtaining higher harvesting rates, increasing the benefits for the forestry company and minimizing the damage to the forest, due to the shorter distance of the machinery in the forest harvesting.

Developing Asia’s infrastructure gap results from both inadequate public resources and a lack of effective channels to mobilize private resources toward desired outcomes. The public-private partnership (PPP) mechanism has evolved to fill the infrastructure gap. However, PPP projects are often at risk of becoming distressed, or worst, being terminated because of the long-term nature of contracts and the many different stakeholders involved. This paper applies survival-time hazard analysis to estimate how project-related, macroeconomic, and institutional factors affect the hazard rate of the projects. Empirical results show that government’s provision of guarantees, involvement of multilateral development banks, and existence of a dedicated PPP unit are important for a project’s success. Privately initiated proposals should be regulated and undergo competitive bidding to reduce the hazard rate of the project and the corresponding burden to the government. Economic growth leads to successful project outcomes. Improved legal and institutional environment can ensure PPP success.