In this paper, we argue that there is much room for China to strengthen its regulatory framework for public-private partnerships (PPPs). We show that infrastructure projects carried out through local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) are largely unregulated PPPs, and significant fiscal risks have already manifested themselves. While PPPs can potentially provide efficiency gains, they can also be used by governments to circumvent budgetary borrowing constraints. Therefore, effective PPP regulation is key to delivering PPPs’ benefits while containing their potential fiscal risks. The authorities have taken concrete steps in order to establish a sound regulatory framework and foster a new generation of PPPs. However, to make the framework effective, we highlight a few issues to be resolved. Based on international best practice, we propose a four-pillar regulatory framework for China, which could be implemented gradually in three stages.

In the 1960s, many East Asian Tiger countries, such as Taiwan, Malaysia, China, etc., faced unfavourable socio-economic conditions like those facing many African countries such as Rwanda. For example, in the 1960s, Singapore was classified as an undeveloped country, with its GDP per capita standing at less than $320. However, all these countries managed to reach a development level like that of Western and North American countries (such as the U.S. and Canada), within a space of less than 15 years. Today, Singapore’s GDP per capita has risen to an incredible $84,501, making it the sixth highest GDP per capita in the world. With Vision 2020, President Kagame promised that Rwanda, which he referred to as “the African lion”, would cruise faster to the middle-income country status faster than Singapore and other middle income status countries, most of which are in East-Asia in less than 20 years. Thirteen years after the introduction of Rwanda’s Vision 2020, President Kagame dashed off the Wall Street Journal and other western media which often referred to Rwanda’s economic development as “the economic tiger of Africa” in his 2013 famous statement as follows: “There is a view that development is a marathon, not a sprint. We do not agree. Development is a marathon that must be run at a sprint. In our pursuit of progress, we have, of course, looked to East Asia’s so-called “tiger” economies for inspiration. But Africa’s experience is unique, and we must now define our own destiny. So, while being described as an “African tiger” is a welcome recognition of how far Rwanda has come, perhaps it isn’t quite right. After all, our continent has its own big cat. Step forward, the new lions of Africa.”. To achieve this objective between 2000 and 2020, Rwanda’s GDP per capita needed to increase from 254.94 USD (2000) to $1240 (in 2020), and the GDP growth rate was to grow consistently between 7% and 10% for a period of 20 years (2000–2020). The objective of this article is to critically analyse how the Government of Rwanda failed to achieve its promise of achieving a middle-income status (MICS) between 2000 and 2020. In 2000 the Rwandan president Paul Kagame launched Rwanda’s Vision 2020. This was a long-term framework for Rwanda’s development in 20 (i.e., 2000–2020). The idea behind Rwanda’s leadership was to imitate whatever Singapore did to become a developed country in just 15 years after its independence in 1965. Blatantly stated, President Paul Kagame wanted to turn his country into the Singapore of Africa. The IMF states that “Vision 2020 was the longer-term socio-economic development framework that sought to transform Rwanda into a middle-income country by 2020”. There is no doubt that Rwanda has made some developmental strides through the implementation of Vision 2020 as an instrument for operationalisation for the Singaporean-modelled developmental state over the past 20 years and has succeeded in some areas. However, the Government of Rwanda has failed in many areas and has failed to achieve the prestigious MICS in 2020. Therefore, among the many gaps in the current literature that this research seeks close is to find out what were some of the accomplishments that Rwanda’s Vision 2020 was unable to achieve? Why did the Government of Rwanda fail to achieve middle-income status within 20 years? What insights can other developing countries gain from Rwanda’s Vision 2020 experience? This study is a significant contribution to the current theoretical knowledge as it sheds light on the reasons behind the Government of Rwanda’s failure to achieve middle-income country status in 2020, a topic that has been largely ignored by the Government’s documents and the media. Despite Rwanda’s Vision 2020, there has been no scientific study to date that has attempted to deal with this topic. Therefore, this study, titled “Why the Government of Rwanda failed to achieve middle-income status (MICS) in 2020” is likely the first of its kind. By addressing

The COVID-19 pandemic and the Movement Control Order (MCO) have had a negative impact on the financial well-being and digital well-being of B40 or small household income families in urban areas. In responding to the crisis, the government had launched multiple assistance programs to assist the group. Hence, the study intends to examine the relationship of government assistance towards digital and financial well-being of the group. Utilizing survey, the study involved 417 respondents living at the Public Housing Project (PPR) residential areas in Kuala Lumpur—the capital of Malaysia. The data was analyzed using Smart PLS and the key findings were (1) government assistance programs significantly affect the digital well-being and financial well-being of B40 urban families. However, there is no significant relationship between financial well-being and digital well-being. Besides, the Importance-Performance Analysis (IPA) indicated that the importance of government assistance programs towards digital well-being performance is higher than financial well-being. The assistance programs offered by the government plays essential role to ease the digital and financial constraints of B40 urban families during a difficult time. Reforms to the government assistance programs, the empowerment of digital aid packages, and the enhancement of social security net initiatives for B40 urban families are necessary to enhance the group’s preparedness and resilience in the face of new shocks in the future.