It has become commonplace to describe publicly provided infrastructure as being in a sorry state and to advance public-private partnership as a possible remedy. This essay adopts a skeptical but not a cynical posture toward those claims. The paper starts by reviewing the comparative properties of markets and politics within a theory of budgeting where the options are construction and maintenance. This analytical point of departure explains how incongruities between political and market action can favor construction over maintenance. In short, political entities can engage in an implicit form of public debt by reducing maintenance spending to support other budgetary items. This implicit form of public debt does not manifest in higher interest rates but rather manifests in crumbling bridges and other infrastructure due to the transfer of maintenance into other budgetary activities.

The wealth of nations depends on the quality of their infrastructure. Often, however, infrastructure suffers from ineffective investments and poor maintenance. Proposed solutions, such as New Public Management or Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) tend to develop into Politicians-Private Partnerships as politicians collude with private firms to exploit present and future tax-payers. Therefore, it is necessary to give citizens better control over collective decision making. While there is a significant economic literature on empowering citizens via decentralization and direct democratic institutions, the role of electoral rules has thus far been rather neglected. An interesting case in point is Switzerland, which is well known for its high-quality infrastructure, extensive decentralization, and direct democracy. However, this paper argues that there is an additional and previously neglected institution that moves Swiss politicians away from client politics towards better serving public interest: Switzerland’s unique electoral institutions which effectively combine proportional elections with multi-seat majority elections. We explain how these institutions work, how they enhance the relationships between citizens and public and private entities, and we argue that they could be implemented in other countries.

In many cases, the expected efficiency advantages of public-private partnership (PPP) projects as a specific form of infrastructure provision did not materialize ex post. From a Public Choice perspective, one simple explanation for many of the problems surrounded by the governance of PPPs is that the public decision-makers being involved in the process of initiating and implementing PPP projects (namely, politicians and public bureaucrats) in many situations make low- cost decisions in the sense of Kirchgässner (1948–2017). That is, their decisions may have a high impact on the wealth of the jurisdiction in which the PPP is located (most notably, on the welfare of citizen-taxpayers in this jurisdiction) but, at the same time, these decisions often only have a low impact on the private welfare of the individual decision-makers in politics and bureaucracy. The latter, for example, in many settings often have a low economic incentive to monitor/control what the private-sector partners are doing (or not doing) within a PPP arrangement. The purpose of this paper is to draw greater attention to the problems created by low-cost decisions for the governance of PPPs. Moreover, the paper discusses potential remedies arising from the viewpoint of Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy.

Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are mostly presented as a means to introduce efficient procurement methods and better value for money to taxpayers. However, the complexity of the PPP mechanism, their lack of transparency, accounting rules and implicit liabilities make it often impossible to perceive the amount of public expenditure involved and the long-run impact on taxpayers, providing room for fiscal illusion, i.e., the illusion that PPPs are much less expensive than traditional public investments. This psaper, thanks to a systematic review of the literature on the EU countries experience, tries to unveil the sources of this illusion by looking at the reasons behind the PPPs’ choice, their real costs, and the sources of fiscal risks. The literature suggests that PPPs are more costly than public funding, especially when contingent liabilities are not taken into account, and are employed as mechanisms to circumvent budgetary restrictions and to spend off-balance. The paper concludes that the public sector should share more risks with private sectors by reducing the amount of guarantees, and should prevent governments from operating through a sleight of hand that deflects attention away from off-balance financing, by applying a neutral fiscal recording system.

This review provided a detailed overview of the different synthesis and characterization methods of polymeric nanoparticles. Nanoparticles are defined as solid and colloidal particles of macromolecular substances ranging in size under 100 nm. Different types of nanoparticles are used in many biological fields (bio-sensing, biological separation, molecular imaging, anticancer therapy, etc.). The new features and functions provided by nano dimensions are largely different from their bulk forms. High volume/surface ratio, improved resolution and multifunctional capability make these materials gain many new features. 

Some developmental projects are created by people-private partnerships (PPP), particularly where recovery is acquirable by levying the users. Such PPPs are successful for construction of roads, bridges, running toilet facilities and conveyance facility in mode of use and pay. Likewise, public-scientist partnerships (PSPs) will be successful, where monitored impacts can be used to derive benefit. But such example cases are not so popular in utilizing new research results and derive benefits from natural resources and enhance productivity. There is a demand for similar partnership projects in research area. In this study modality of the PSP to create boost engine for natural resource conservation and bring economic prosperity is established. A novel PSP launch was synthesized on useful food crop viz. finger millet (Elusiane corcona (l)), which has been known since long past, and now is regaining popularity. It was possible to enhance additional annual production of 5.755 million tonnes of finger millet grain, equivalent to additional income of Rs 11,510 crores. Against this the scientist partnership share was 0.49x million tonnes grain and economic equivalency of Rs 992 crores, which was just 7–8%, with same level of input in agriculture. Additional benefits were sustainability of production and resources consecration, reduction of greenhouse gas emission (GHGs), particularly nitrous oxide (N₂O), largely emanating from agriculture and responsible for depletion of ozone layer. The finger millet stiff stem will be useable for production of ply-board filling material that will be innovative building material for housing and infrastructure developments and making furniture.