This article analyzes the use and limitations of nonmonetary contract incentives in managing third-party accountability in human services. In-depth case studies of residential care homes for the elderly and integrated family service centers, two contrasting contracting contexts, were conducted in Hong Kong. These two programs vary in service programmability and service interdependency. In-depth interviews with 17 managers of 48 Residential Care Homes for the Elderly (RCHEs) and 20 managers of 10 Integrated Family Service Centers (IFSCs) were conducted. Interviews with the managers show that when service programmability was high and service interdependency was low, nonmonetary contract incentives such as opportunities for self-actualization professionally or reputation were effective in improving service quality from nonprofit and for-profit contractors. When service programmability was low and service interdependency was high, despite that only nonprofit organizations were contracted, many frontline service managers reported that professional accountability was undermined by ambiguous service scope, performance emphasis on case turnover, risk shift from public service units and a lack of formal accountability relationships between service units in the service network. The findings shed light on the limitations of nonmonetary contract incentives.

The use of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) has led to several opposing legal opinions regarding their violations of international law. The responsibility of the state, individuals, and corporations as producers, designers, and programmers is all being taken into consideration. If the decision to kill humans without “meaningful human control” is transferred to computers, it would be hard to attribute accountability for the actions of AWS to their corporations. Consequently, this means that corporate actors will enjoy impunity in all cases. The present paper indicates that the most significant problem arising from the use of AWS is the attribution of responsibility for its violation. Corporations are not subject to liability for the legitimate use of weapons under international law. The main problem with corporate responsibility, according to article 25 (4) of the Rome Statute, is that the provision only relates to individual criminal responsibility and that the ICC shall only have jurisdiction over natural persons. Nevertheless, corporations may be held accountable under aspects of international law. The paper proposes a more positive view on artificial intelligence, raising corporations’ accountability in international law by historically linking the judging of business leaders. The article identifies aiding and abetting as well as co-perpetration as the two modes of accountability under international law potentially linked to AWS. The study also explores the main ambiguity in international law relating to corporate aiding and abetting of human rights violations by presenting the confusion on determining the standards of these 2 modes of liability before the ICC and International ad doc Tribunal. Moreover, with the new age of war heavily dependent on AI and AWS, one cannot easily and precisely ascertain who must be held accountable for war crimes because of the unanticipated facts in decision-making combined with the aiding or abetting of violations of international law. International law prioritizes the goal of ending impunity for the individual and largely neglects the need to achieve the same goal for corporate complicity. In sum, progress to regulate the use of AWS by corporate actors could be enormously helpful to the cause of ending impunity.

This article advocates for a fundamental shift in England’s legal approach to professional negligence, particularly within the domains of accounting and audit. English law should move away from its intricate and unclear case law surrounding professional negligence towards a clearly defined test for professional misconduct. Drawing upon a comparative analysis with the legal framework in the United States, where auditors are not shielded from liability under the law, the article highlights the need for a more consistent and accountable legal landscape in England. One of the main aspects that necessitates change is the proximity test, as set out in the Caparo case, which currently prevents auditors from being held liable for negligence to investors (as third parties)—despite investors relying on auditors for their professional skill to audit accounts. As investors rely on audited accounts when making financial decisions, a well-defined test for professional negligence should align English law with international standards and empower victims to seek compensation from the auditors themselves and/or the auditors’ professional indemnity insurance. Such a change would enhance trust and transparency in the financial domain.

The purpose of this study is to determine the impact of internal university social responsibility policies on the administrative personnel of a Colombian university. Under a non-probabilistic sampling method, the study collected information from 58 collaborators selected from a total of 92 working at the university. The information was collected through a structured questionnaire and evaluated using the generalized linear model. The results indicate that administrators perceive that university social responsibility policies have an adverse effect on the work environment. This is justified by the fact that the university’s actions are not oriented towards the welfare of its personnel. In conclusion, universities should concentrate enormous efforts on implementing strategies that foster the commitment of their collaborators, in order to generate a significant impact on their responsibility and motivation.

An unprecedented demand for accurate information and action moved the industry toward RegTech where computing, big data, and social and mobile technologies could help achieve the demand. With the introduction and adoption of RegTech, regulatory changes were introduced in some countries. Enhanced regulatory changes to ease the barriers to market entry, data protection, and payment systems were also introduced to ensure a smooth transition into RegTech. However, regulatory changes fell short of comprehensiveness to address all the issues related to RegTech’s operation. This article is an attempt to devise a Privacy Model for RegTech so industries and regulators can protect the interests of various stakeholders. This model comprises four variables, and each variable consists of many items. The four variables are data protection, accountability, transparency, and organizational design. It is expected that the adoption of this Privacy Model will help industries and regulators embrace standards while being innovative in the development and use of RegTech.

The pursuit of good governance by companies confronts a fundamental challenge: defining what constitutes “good governance”. Existing corporate governance codes and their implementation documents fall short of offering a clear answer to this crucial question. Despite the establishment of a reference framework years ago, the focus has shifted from defining the objectives of good governance to a consensus on the means of achieving these objectives. Unfortunately, this consensus often absolves stakeholders from providing detailed explanations. Achieving effective good governance necessitates a shift in focus towards the underlying goals of governance structures. Two potential approaches emerge in this context. While many companies rely on codes without explicitly outlining their objectives, there is a compelling case for urging or mandating them to articulate the purposes of the governance methods they employ in their reports. This level of specificity has the potential to enhance the reflective qualities of the transparency process, fostering a more comprehensive understanding of the governance landscape. Beyond merely discussing the objectives of corporate governance, the pursuit of good governance necessitates the implementation of instruments whose efficacy transcends reliance solely on market discipline. The aim is not to undermine the imperatives of transparency and justification. Instead, the intention is to recognize that these elements, while essential, do not independently ensure the effectiveness of soft law instruments, such as governance codes. Nowadays, it is crucial to assess the extent to which traditional corporate governance codes respond to the needs of companies in the era of digitalization and sustainability. Therefore, conducting a critical analysis of the existing corporate governance codes will contribute in shedding light on the gaps of these instruments to come up with recommendations for improvements. Aims and objectives: This article will focus on the following areas: Defining the role and purpose of corporate governance codes in enhancing corporate performance and accountability and discussing the challenges and limitations of corporate governance codes, including compliance issues and enforcement challenges. Presenting empirical evidence on the impact of corporate governance codes on corporate behavior and analyzing, through the principle of comply or explain, whether code adherence leads to improved corporate governance practices and financial performance. Discussing emerging trends in corporate governance and offering recommendations for improving the effectiveness of corporate governance codes.