The paper lays out basic design options for infrastructure policy. It first sketches mechanisms to assess demand. Then it sets out a hierarchy of issues starting with choice of market structure followed by conduct regulation. Ownership options are largely a function of market structure choices. The implications for finance—the topic of much day-to-day discussion in infrastructure policy-making—follow from these various prior choices. The discussion naturally circumscribes the role for the so-called public-private partnerships, their uses and pitfalls.

Cocoa is important for the economy and rural development of Ghana. However, small-scale cocoa production is the leading agricultural product driver of deforestation in Ghana. Uncertain tree tenure disincentivizes farmers to retain and nurture trees on their farms. There is therefore the call for structures that promote tree retention and management within cocoa farming. We examined tenure barriers and governance for tree resources on cocoa farms. Data was collected from 200 cocoa farmers from two regions using multistage sampling technique. Information was gathered on tree ownership and fate of tree resources on cocoa farms, tree felling permit acquisition and associated challenges and illegal logging and compensation payments on cocoa farms. Results suggest 62.2% of farmers own trees on their farms. However, these farmers may or may not have ownership rights over the trees depending on the ownership of their farmlands. More than half of the farmers indicated they require felling permits to harvest trees on their farms, indicative of the awareness of established tree harvesting procedures. Seventy percent of the farmers have never experienced illegal logging on their farms. There is however the need to educate the remaining 30% on their rights and build their compensation negotiation powers for destructions to their cocoa crops. This study has highlighted ownership and governance issues with cocoa farming and it is important for the sustainability of on-farm tree resources and Ghana’s forest at large.

The use of infrastructure as a catalyst for Indonesia’s economic growth faces significant challenges. One example is the construction projects, which have not reached the intended goal and have led to an increase in investment cost compared to the original plan. Additionally, the interaction between the government and companies involved in toll-road construction projects under the public-private partnerships (PPP) mechanism has yet to produce good quality project governance and expected project performance. This study aimed to find empirical data on the determination of project intellectual capital and project ownership structure through good project governance on toll-road project performance in Indonesia. This study adopted a quantitative approach that involved data collected through a survey conducted among toll-road projects from 2015 to 2019. The data was analyzed with Structural Equation Modeling Partial Least Square (SEM-PLS). The results showed that project intellectual capital and project ownership structure significantly affected good project governance. Good project governance Practices significantly affected project performance. Project intellectual capital and project ownership structure influenced project performance through the mediation of good project governance. Conversely, two hypotheses were not supported by the data, i.e., the effect of project intellectual capital and project ownership structure on project performance. The findings of this research contributed to the literature regarding the implementation of collaborative governance in PPPs toll road development projects in Indonesia by providing a framework and assessment tools, which could be valuable for researchers and policymakers in analyzing and evaluating the governance and performance of toll road construction PPP projects.

The aim of this study was to elucidate the expected moderating effect exerted by institutional owners on the intricate correlation between the characteristics of boards of directors and the issue of earnings management, as gauged by the loan loss provisions.The sample encompassed all the banks listed on the Amman Stock Exchange (ASE) over the period between 2010 and 2022, representing a total of 151 observations. The results derived from the examination clearly demonstrate that the institutional owners have a key impact on augmenting the monitoring tasks and responsibilities of the boards of directors across the study sample. The results revealed the fundamental role of such owners in strengthening the supervisory tasks carried out by boards of directors in Jordan. A panel data model has been used in the analysis. The results of this study show that the presence of the owner of an institution has a discernible moderating role in the banks' monitoring landscape. Indeed, their presence strengthens the monitoring tasks of the banks’ boards by underscoring the quest to restrict the EM decisions. Interestingly, the results support the monitoring proposition outlined by agency theory, which introduced CG recommendations as a deterrent tool to reduce the expectation gap between banks' owners and their representatives.

This study aimed to evaluate the influence of various factors on the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises with 100% capital ownership in Vietnam. Employing quantitative research methods, the article conducted an analysis of 250 survey samples taken from such enterprises and utilized regression analysis techniques. The findings revealed eight factors that significantly impact the corporate governance of these entities in Vietnam: enterprise awareness, ownership model, the state’s role as an owner, integration, board of members, legal framework, managerial experience, and activity objectives. Leveraging these research outcomes, several recommendations have been proposed to enhance the corporate governance practices within state-owned enterprises holding complete capital ownership in Vietnam.