This study examines the impact of parliamentary thresholds on the Indonesian political system through the lens of the Routine Policy Implementation Model and the Strategic Policy Implementation Model. The main objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of parliamentary thresholds in managing political fragmentation, assess their impact on stability and representation in the legislative system, and understand their implementation’s technical and strategic implications. Using a qualitative approach supported by interview studies and field observations, this research combines analysis of election data in the 2009, 2014, and 2019 elections with a qualitative assessment of policy changes and political dynamics. The Routine Policy Implementation Model focuses on the technical aspects of threshold implementation, including vote counting procedures and seat allocation efficiency. Meanwhile, the Strategic Policy Implementation Model examines the broader implications of these thresholds for political consolidation, government effectiveness, and the representation of minor parties. The results show that the parliamentary threshold has significantly reduced political fragmentation by consolidating the number of parties in Parliament, resulting in a legislative system that is cleaner and easier to administer. However, this consolidation has also marginalized small parties and limited political diversity. The novelty of this study lies in its comprehensive analysis of how parliamentary thresholds affect administrative efficiency and strategic political stability in Indonesia, compared to democratic countries in transition, such as Slovenia and Montenegro. In conclusion, although parliamentary thresholds have increased political stability and government effectiveness, they have also raised concerns about the reduced representation of small and regional parties. The study recommends maintaining balanced thresholds that ensure stability and diversity, implementing mechanisms to review thresholds periodically, and involving diverse stakeholders in adjusting policies to reflect evolving political dynamics. This approach will help balance the need for a stable legislative environment with broad representation.

This article analyzes the use and limitations of nonmonetary contract incentives in managing third-party accountability in human services. In-depth case studies of residential care homes for the elderly and integrated family service centers, two contrasting contracting contexts, were conducted in Hong Kong. These two programs vary in service programmability and service interdependency. In-depth interviews with 17 managers of 48 Residential Care Homes for the Elderly (RCHEs) and 20 managers of 10 Integrated Family Service Centers (IFSCs) were conducted. Interviews with the managers show that when service programmability was high and service interdependency was low, nonmonetary contract incentives such as opportunities for self-actualization professionally or reputation were effective in improving service quality from nonprofit and for-profit contractors. When service programmability was low and service interdependency was high, despite that only nonprofit organizations were contracted, many frontline service managers reported that professional accountability was undermined by ambiguous service scope, performance emphasis on case turnover, risk shift from public service units and a lack of formal accountability relationships between service units in the service network. The findings shed light on the limitations of nonmonetary contract incentives.

Border cities face significant challenges due to political, environmental, and social issues. Strong urban governance can help resolve many of these problems, but it requires identifying practical factors specific to each city’s location. This study aimed to assess the state of urban governance in Paveh, a border city with a population of 25,771 people. The research used both primary data collection (through a questionnaire) and secondary data sources (local and national databases and documents). The study randomly selected 379 households from Paveh’s population and determined a reliability value of 0.913 using the Cochrane procedure. To assess Paveh’s urban governance, eight criteria were used: participatory, rule-of-law compliance, transparency, responsiveness, consensus-oriented, equitable and inclusive, effective and efficient, and accountability. The findings revealed that Paveh’s urban governance, particularly in the dimensions of transparency and participation, is in an unfavorable situation.

Background: The background and objectives of the research revolve around bureaucracy as a classic form of the modern division of labor, with Max Weber acknowledging its inevitability. However, the objective implications of the bureaucracy’s iron cage are evident in governance and management experiences. The mayors of Tehran’s districts exemplify how Iranian culture interacts with bureaucracy. This research seeks to establish principles and governance for district governors using an alternative bureaucracy, parallel to conventional bureaucracy. Methods: The methods employed include twenty strategically selected interviews, considering age, municipal area, and work experience for maximum variance. Grounded theory methodology, specifically the approach by Anselm Strauss and Barney Glaser, guides the research, employing open coding, axial coding, and selective coding. MaxQDA 2020 software enhances the qualitative data analysis, facilitating organization, coding, and collaboration within the research team. Results: Findings indicate “inevitable violations” as a common starting point for interviewees, leading to three axes: “preconditions,” “objectives,” and “strategies and mechanisms” of alternative bureaucracy. In conclusion, breaking through bureaucracy becomes necessary for governors to act. Alternative bureaucracy, rooted in experience yet considering the bureaucratic field, requires transcendent goals. Hybridity and ethical principles are crucial when transitioning from conventional bureaucracy to the alternative in urban governance.

The performance of Public Enterprises (PEs) in Namibia has been a long and contentious issue, clamored by continuous bailouts in the face of constant poor performance. The trend of financial bailouts to PEs in Namibia over the years has attracted increased attention into the dynamics of poor PE performance and their fiscal burden on the state. The Namibian government has taken active steps in cutting on PE bailouts and demanding improved performance or face closure. By looking at recent developments in the governance of PEs in Namibia, the purpose and objective of the current study is to analyze whether the current stance and trajectory of government decisions spells a post-honeymoon period in which poor performing PEs will ‘wither and survive or die’ if they do not improve their sustainability index by not relying on financial bailouts. This analysis is aided by the insights provided by the stakeholder, institutional and principal-agent theories. Through the qualitative research method, this study finds that the Namibian government has taken a new attitude and approach in which it will no longer blindly accept and tolerate the poor performance of PEs through continuous bailouts as seen in the past. PEs that are withering will now either survive (through reforms) or die (through liquidation or dissolution).

New Institutional Economics (NIE) uses solutions from law, economics and organization. The purpose of this article is to link in a single analytical approach the institutional environment, its change in the organizations uniting in one, what is happening in contracts with agricultural lands. The explanation of this type of governance means to integrate: theoretical definitions; formal rules (laws, court decisions and other legal acts); economic institutions—means and mechanisms of exchange; legal and economic forms in which, through governance of transactions property rights are transferred and protected. In order to achieve this goal, it is necessary to present the elements of the institutional matrix that are the cause of changes in subordination and coordination. Following the process of implementing an approach for reconciling the legal and economic nature of the contract forms and integrating the states, contract organizations and transaction costs in a common model. In order to solve the research problems tasks are adapted methods from law, economics, statistics. Such are: (a) positive legal analysis of legislation; (b) historical (retrospective) method of analysis of changes; (c) discrete-structural analysis to explain the process; (d) comparative-institutional analysis to clarify alternatives and an explanation of any of the effects; (е) regression analysis to model the relationships and present possible one’s scenarios to show the direction in which changes are needed. Changes in legislation, legal forms, mechanisms and the amount of payments create new behavioral patterns that change the contract. Therefore, in retrospect, we are witnessing how the number of changes in legal acts, the amount of fees; the number of participants-administrators of the processes; the number and registers - change the number of transactions; the duration of the actions in the contracts, which ultimately predetermines the different amounts of transaction costs for agricultural lands. This interdependence was established by constructing an econometric model. The analysis presents opportunities for change that would lead to scenarios with a reduced level of transaction costs, that is, improving governance and showing the way to improve the institutional environment related to agricultural lands in Bulgaria.