This research attempts to investigate the effect of audit quality on firm value in the high corporate governance context. In addition, this study seeks to examine the role of institutional shareholders as a moderating variable on the relationship between audit quality and firm value. Dataset includes the 95 (out of 575) Thai listed companies which fully and completely implement the Corporate Governance Code (CG Code) voluntary disclosure recommended by OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) in 2021. Multiple linear regression and Hayes’s regression-based analysis are done using market capitalization as the dependent variable. The research results illustrate that audit quality relates to firm value in a negative way, while profitability and institutional shareholders relate to firm value in a positive manner. Moreover, the interaction effect between audit quality and institutional shareholders wields a significant negative impact on the association between audit quality and firm value, which indicates that the negative effect of audit quality on firm value is stronger when more firm shares are owned by institutional shareholders. The results of this study would potentially be very useful to managers, financial advisors, and policymakers to observe the nature and vagaries of audit quality in high corporate governance environment, especially when institutional shareholders hold a significant proportion of firm shares. The study offers practical suggestions and recommendations for audit quality and institutional shareholders, which are essential for overall operating efficiency and firm value. The outcomes can help improve corporate governance practices, which in turn enhance the share price and profits.

The central government of China has intensively guided regional integration and policy coordination towards the development of digital governance in the last ten years. The Guangdong-Hong Kong-Macao Greater Bay was one of the most important regions of China expected to accelerate regional development through policy coordination and establishment of digital infrastructures. This article adopted the method of content analysis to explore the policy transitions of digital governance in the Greater Bay including policy contents (in terms of policy objectives and instruments) and policy networks. Based on our empirical analysis, we found that top-down guidance from the central government did not necessarily generate regional coordination. Different governments of the same region could start policy coordination from shared policy objectives and policy instruments and establish innovative governance frameworks to achieve consensus. Therefore, regional coordination could be fulfilled.

This study was conducted to examine the roles of interconnected stakeholders based on power and interests in Ecotourism Management Policy for Dalegan Beach, Gresik Regency, Indonesia using a qualitative method. Data were collected through observation, in-depth interviews, and focus group discussions with stakeholders. Furthermore, the identification of stakeholders interest in ecotourism development was based on the strengths, important positions, and influence of stakeholders categorized into several groups. The results showed that there were three categories of stakeholders, namely Main, Supporting, and Key. In the Village Government, Dalegan Beach Tourism Manager acted as a key player and the local community had the main role. Additionally, East Java Province Maritime and Fisheries Service, Gresik Regency Tourism and Creative Economy Office, Culture, Youth and Sports Office, Gresik Regency Public Works and Spatial Planning Service, and Commanditaire Vennotschaap Mahera (CV Mahera), the landowner, were recognized for lacking direct inclusion in policy matters. Different influences were reported on the legal decisions of the government to offer insights to policymakers in tourism governance. Subsequent study could examine the conflicts of interest among stakeholders.

The Sipongi System is essential in dealing with forest and land fires because this system provides real-time data that empowers stakeholders and communities to proactively overcome fire dangers. Its advantages are seen in its ability to provide detailed information regarding weather conditions, wind patterns, water levels in peatlands, air quality, and responsible work units. This data facilitates efficient decision-making and resource allocation for fire prevention and control. As an embodiment of Collaborative Governance, the Sipongi System actively involves various stakeholders, including government institutions, local communities, environmental organizations and the private sector. This cooperative approach fosters collective responsibility and accountability, improving fire management efforts. The Sipongi approach is critical in reducing forest and land fires in Indonesia by providing real-time data and a collaborative governance model. This results in faster response times, more effective fire prevention and better resource allocation. Although initially designed for Indonesia, the adaptable nature of the system makes it a blueprint for addressing similar challenges in other countries and regions, tailored to specific needs and environmental conditions. Qualitative research methods underlie this study, including interviews with key stakeholders and analysis of credible sources. Government officials, community leaders, environmental experts and organizational representatives were interviewed to comprehensively examine the mechanisms of the Sipongi System and its impact on forest and land fire management in Indonesia. Future research should explore the application of Sipongi Systems and collaborative governance in various contexts by conducting comparative studies across countries and ecosystems. Additionally, assessing the long-term impact and sustainability of the Sipongi System is critical to evaluating its effectiveness over time.

This article analyzes the use and limitations of nonmonetary contract incentives in managing third-party accountability in human services. In-depth case studies of residential care homes for the elderly and integrated family service centers, two contrasting contracting contexts, were conducted in Hong Kong. These two programs vary in service programmability and service interdependency. In-depth interviews with 17 managers of 48 Residential Care Homes for the Elderly (RCHEs) and 20 managers of 10 Integrated Family Service Centers (IFSCs) were conducted. Interviews with the managers show that when service programmability was high and service interdependency was low, nonmonetary contract incentives such as opportunities for self-actualization professionally or reputation were effective in improving service quality from nonprofit and for-profit contractors. When service programmability was low and service interdependency was high, despite that only nonprofit organizations were contracted, many frontline service managers reported that professional accountability was undermined by ambiguous service scope, performance emphasis on case turnover, risk shift from public service units and a lack of formal accountability relationships between service units in the service network. The findings shed light on the limitations of nonmonetary contract incentives.