This paper proposes an incentive model to involve communities and industries in effectively managing coastal waste in Makassar, Indonesia. The model seeks to incentivize stakeholders to invest in waste management solutions and enable public stakeholders to monitor and evaluate the progress of waste management activities. The model actively encourages participation from all stakeholders and builds upon existing efforts to promote environmental accountability. The proposed model includes several key components. It focused on public and private partnerships that should be fostered to coordinate stakeholder approaches and provide capital investment. It also focused on a financial reward scheme that should be adopted to incentivize businesses and individuals that invest in waste management initiatives. Performance bonus awards and tax incentives are proposed as possible incentive schemes. Lastly, a regulatory framework should be developed to ensure environmental standards are met and regulated. The framework should include regular reporting and auditing requirements and the implementation of penalties for those who fail to comply. The proposed incentive model seeks to engage stakeholders in effectively managing coastal waste in Makassar, Indonesia, through public and private incentive schemes.

This paper uses Public Choice analysis to examine the case for and experience with Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). A PPP is a contractual platform which connects a governmental body and a private entity. The goal is to provide a public sector program, service, or asset that would normally be provided exclusively by a public sector entity. This paper focuses on PPPs in developed countries, but it also draws on studies of PPPs in developing countries. The economics literature generally defines PPPs as long-term contractual arrangements between a public authority (local or central government) and a private supplier for the delivery of services. The private sector supplier takes responsibility for building infrastructure components, securing financing of the investment, and then managing and maintaining this facility.

However, in addition to those formed through contracts, PPPs may take other forms such as those developed in response to tax subvention or coercion, as in the case of regulatory mandates. A key element of PPP is that the private partner takes on a significant portion of the risk through a schedule of specified remuneration, contingency payments, and provision for dispute resolution. PPPs typically are long-term arrangements and involve large corporations on the private side, but may also be limited to specific phases of a project.

The types of PPPs discussed in this paper exclude arrangements which may result from government mandates such as the statutory emission mandates imposed on automobile manufacturers and industrial facilities (e.g., power plants). It also excludes PPP-like organizations resulting from US section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides tax subsidies for certain public charities, scientific research organizations, and organizations whose goals are to prevent cruelty to animals or erect public monuments at no expense to the government. This paper concludes that an array of Public Choice tools are applicable to understanding the emergence, success, or failure of PPPs. Several short case studies are provided to illustrate the practicalities of PPPs. 

The purpose of this article is to determine the equitability of airport and university allocations throughout Ethiopian regional states based on the number of airports and institutions per 1 million people. According to the sample, the majority of respondents believed that university allocation in Ethiopia is equitable. In contrast, the majority of respondents who were asked about airports stated that there is an uneven distribution of airports across Ethiopia’s regional states. Hence, both interviewees and focus group discussants stated that there is a lack of equitable distribution of universities and airports across Ethiopia’s regional states. This paper contributes a lesson on how to create a comprehensive set of determining factors for equitable infrastructure allocation. It also provides a methodological improvement for assessing infrastructure equity and other broader implications across Ethiopian regional states.

An α, α^′-dipyridyl adduct of a complex compound hexaaquatribenzene-1,2,4,5-tetracarbonatotetra iron (III) with porous structure was synthesized for the first time. According to the results of elemental, X-ray, IR-spectroscopic and differential-thermal analyses the individuality, chemical formula, thermal destruction, and form of coordination of acidic anion and dipyridyl were established. During interaction of a complex compound with dipyridyl, it completely loses all crystallization molecule of water resulting in a compound with a chemical formula of Fe₄(C₆H₂(COO)₄)₃(dpy)₂(dipyridyl). Using the identification of diffraction pattern the parameters of lattice cell of the complex compound were determined.