In many cases, the expected efficiency advantages of public-private partnership (PPP) projects as a specific form of infrastructure provision did not materialize ex post. From a Public Choice perspective, one simple explanation for many of the problems surrounded by the governance of PPPs is that the public decision-makers being involved in the process of initiating and implementing PPP projects (namely, politicians and public bureaucrats) in many situations make low- cost decisions in the sense of Kirchgässner (1948–2017). That is, their decisions may have a high impact on the wealth of the jurisdiction in which the PPP is located (most notably, on the welfare of citizen-taxpayers in this jurisdiction) but, at the same time, these decisions often only have a low impact on the private welfare of the individual decision-makers in politics and bureaucracy. The latter, for example, in many settings often have a low economic incentive to monitor/control what the private-sector partners are doing (or not doing) within a PPP arrangement. The purpose of this paper is to draw greater attention to the problems created by low-cost decisions for the governance of PPPs. Moreover, the paper discusses potential remedies arising from the viewpoint of Public Choice and Constitutional Political Economy.

Our intention in assembling this special issue of the Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development is to offer a state-of-the-art tour through the political economy issues associated with the provision of public infrastructure, and with the use of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) in particular. Anyone who is familiar with PPPs cannot fail to be impressed by the diversity of positions and claims regarding their properties. Some scholars maintain that PPPs are an efficient tool to enhance productivity due to their ability to manage demand-side risk. In contrast, other scholars see in PPPs a scheme whereby the public assumes the risk while the private partner takes the profit.