Flexibility in committee size and the effect on collective performance: The unanimity rule

Ruth Ben-Yashar

doi:10.24294/jipd.v8i11.8361

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Flexibility in committee size and the effect on collective performance: The unanimity rule

Ruth Ben-Yashar

Journal of Infrastructure Policy and Development 2024, 8(11), 8361; https://doi.org/10.24294/jipd.v8i11.8361

Submitted：02 Aug 2024

Accepted：21 Aug 2024

Published：18 Oct 2024

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Abstract

This paper contributes to the understanding of how flexibility in the number of members in a decision-making committee in a multistage project can enhance the accuracy and efficiency of the decisions taken. While most projects typically employ a fixed number of decision makers, the paper demonstrates the advantages of adjusting the committee size according to the project’s varying complexity at different phases of the project. In particular, we show that allowing for flexibility in the size of a committee increases the likelihood of reaching a correct decision under the unanimity rule. We analyze this issue when the decision maker’s competence is independent of the state of nature and when it is not. The results are compared to those under the simple majority rule.

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References

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