Learning from experience to improve future infrastructure public-private partnerships is a focal issue for policy makers, financiers, implementers, and private sector stakeholders. An extensive body of case studies and “lessons learned” aims to improve the likelihood of success and attempts to avoid future contract failures across sectors and geographies. This paper examines whether countries do, indeed, learn from experience to improve the probability of success of public-private partnerships at the national level. The purview of the paper is not to diagnose learning across all aspects of public-private partnerships globally, but rather to focus on whether experience has an effect on the most extreme cases of public-private partnership contract failure, premature contract cancellation. The analysis utilizes mixed-effects probit regression combined with spline models to test empirically whether general public-private partnership experience has an impact on reducing the chances of contract cancellation for future projects. The results confirm what the market intuitively knows, that is, that public-private partnership experience reduces the likelihood of contract cancellation. But the results also provide a perhaps less intuitive finding: the benefits of learning are typically concentrated in the first few public-private partnership deals. Moreover, the results show that the probability of cancellation varies across sectors and suggests the relative complexity of water public-private partnerships compared with energy and transport projects. An estimated $1.5 billion per year could have been saved with interventions and support to reduce cancellations in less experienced countries (those with fewer than 23 prior public-private partnerships).

Projects implemented under life cycle contracts have become increasingly common in recent years to ensure the quality of construction and maintenance of energy infrastructure facilities. A key parameter for energy facility construction projects implemented under life cycle contracts is their duration and deadlines. Therefore, the systematic identification, monitoring, and comprehensive assessment of risks affecting the timing of work on the design and construction is an urgent practical task. The purpose of this work is to study the strength of the influence of various risks on the duration of a project implemented on the terms of a life cycle contract. The use of the expert assessment method allows for identifying the most likely risks for the design and construction phases, as well as determining the ranges of deviations from the baseline indicator. Using the obtained expert evaluations, a model reflecting the range and the most probable duration of the design and construction works under the influence of risk events was built by the Monte-Carlo statistical method. The results obtained allow monitoring and promptly detecting deviations in the actual duration of work from the basic deadlines set in the life cycle contract. This will give an opportunity to accurately respond to emerging risks and build a mutually beneficial relationship between the parties to life cycle contracts.

I summarize the current regulatory decisions aimed at combating the debt load of the population in Russia. Further, I show that the level of delinquency of the population on loans is growing despite the regulatory measures taken. In my opinion, the basis of regulatory policy should move from de facto pushing personal bankruptcies to preventing them. I put forward a hypothesis and statistically prove the expediency of quantitative restrictions on one borrower. It is necessary to introduce reports to the credit bureaus of some types of overdue debts, which are not actually reported now. It is also necessary to change the order of debt repayment established by law, allowing the principal and current interest to be paid first, which will prevent the expansion of the debt.

This article analyzes the use and limitations of nonmonetary contract incentives in managing third-party accountability in human services. In-depth case studies of residential care homes for the elderly and integrated family service centers, two contrasting contracting contexts, were conducted in Hong Kong. These two programs vary in service programmability and service interdependency. In-depth interviews with 17 managers of 48 Residential Care Homes for the Elderly (RCHEs) and 20 managers of 10 Integrated Family Service Centers (IFSCs) were conducted. Interviews with the managers show that when service programmability was high and service interdependency was low, nonmonetary contract incentives such as opportunities for self-actualization professionally or reputation were effective in improving service quality from nonprofit and for-profit contractors. When service programmability was low and service interdependency was high, despite that only nonprofit organizations were contracted, many frontline service managers reported that professional accountability was undermined by ambiguous service scope, performance emphasis on case turnover, risk shift from public service units and a lack of formal accountability relationships between service units in the service network. The findings shed light on the limitations of nonmonetary contract incentives.