The Sipongi System is essential in dealing with forest and land fires because this system provides real-time data that empowers stakeholders and communities to proactively overcome fire dangers. Its advantages are seen in its ability to provide detailed information regarding weather conditions, wind patterns, water levels in peatlands, air quality, and responsible work units. This data facilitates efficient decision-making and resource allocation for fire prevention and control. As an embodiment of Collaborative Governance, the Sipongi System actively involves various stakeholders, including government institutions, local communities, environmental organizations and the private sector. This cooperative approach fosters collective responsibility and accountability, improving fire management efforts. The Sipongi approach is critical in reducing forest and land fires in Indonesia by providing real-time data and a collaborative governance model. This results in faster response times, more effective fire prevention and better resource allocation. Although initially designed for Indonesia, the adaptable nature of the system makes it a blueprint for addressing similar challenges in other countries and regions, tailored to specific needs and environmental conditions. Qualitative research methods underlie this study, including interviews with key stakeholders and analysis of credible sources. Government officials, community leaders, environmental experts and organizational representatives were interviewed to comprehensively examine the mechanisms of the Sipongi System and its impact on forest and land fire management in Indonesia. Future research should explore the application of Sipongi Systems and collaborative governance in various contexts by conducting comparative studies across countries and ecosystems. Additionally, assessing the long-term impact and sustainability of the Sipongi System is critical to evaluating its effectiveness over time.

Cocoa is important for the economy and rural development of Ghana. However, small-scale cocoa production is the leading agricultural product driver of deforestation in Ghana. Uncertain tree tenure disincentivizes farmers to retain and nurture trees on their farms. There is therefore the call for structures that promote tree retention and management within cocoa farming. We examined tenure barriers and governance for tree resources on cocoa farms. Data was collected from 200 cocoa farmers from two regions using multistage sampling technique. Information was gathered on tree ownership and fate of tree resources on cocoa farms, tree felling permit acquisition and associated challenges and illegal logging and compensation payments on cocoa farms. Results suggest 62.2% of farmers own trees on their farms. However, these farmers may or may not have ownership rights over the trees depending on the ownership of their farmlands. More than half of the farmers indicated they require felling permits to harvest trees on their farms, indicative of the awareness of established tree harvesting procedures. Seventy percent of the farmers have never experienced illegal logging on their farms. There is however the need to educate the remaining 30% on their rights and build their compensation negotiation powers for destructions to their cocoa crops. This study has highlighted ownership and governance issues with cocoa farming and it is important for the sustainability of on-farm tree resources and Ghana’s forest at large.

This article analyzes the use and limitations of nonmonetary contract incentives in managing third-party accountability in human services. In-depth case studies of residential care homes for the elderly and integrated family service centers, two contrasting contracting contexts, were conducted in Hong Kong. These two programs vary in service programmability and service interdependency. In-depth interviews with 17 managers of 48 Residential Care Homes for the Elderly (RCHEs) and 20 managers of 10 Integrated Family Service Centers (IFSCs) were conducted. Interviews with the managers show that when service programmability was high and service interdependency was low, nonmonetary contract incentives such as opportunities for self-actualization professionally or reputation were effective in improving service quality from nonprofit and for-profit contractors. When service programmability was low and service interdependency was high, despite that only nonprofit organizations were contracted, many frontline service managers reported that professional accountability was undermined by ambiguous service scope, performance emphasis on case turnover, risk shift from public service units and a lack of formal accountability relationships between service units in the service network. The findings shed light on the limitations of nonmonetary contract incentives.

This study provides an empirical examination of the design and modification of China’s urban social security programme. In doing so, this study complements the popular assumption regarding the correlation between economic growth and social security development. Focusing on the economic and political motivations behind the ruling party’s decision to implement social security, this study first discusses the modification of urban social security and welfare in China. It then empirically demonstrates the mechanisms behind the system’s operation. This study proposes the following hypothesis: in a country like China, a change in the doctrine of the ruling party will affect government alliances, negating the positive impact of economic growth on the development of social security. In demonstrating this hypothesis, this study identifies a political precondition impacting the explanatory power of popular conceptions of social security development.

Border cities face significant challenges due to political, environmental, and social issues. Strong urban governance can help resolve many of these problems, but it requires identifying practical factors specific to each city’s location. This study aimed to assess the state of urban governance in Paveh, a border city with a population of 25,771 people. The research used both primary data collection (through a questionnaire) and secondary data sources (local and national databases and documents). The study randomly selected 379 households from Paveh’s population and determined a reliability value of 0.913 using the Cochrane procedure. To assess Paveh’s urban governance, eight criteria were used: participatory, rule-of-law compliance, transparency, responsiveness, consensus-oriented, equitable and inclusive, effective and efficient, and accountability. The findings revealed that Paveh’s urban governance, particularly in the dimensions of transparency and participation, is in an unfavorable situation.

This paper contributes to a long-standing debate in development practice: under what conditions can externally established participatory groups engage in the collective management of services beyond the life of a project? Using 10 years of panel data on water point functionality from Indonesia’s rural water program, the Program for Community-Based Water Supply and Sanitation, the paper explored the determinants of subnational variation in infrastructure sustainability. It then investigated positive and negative deviance cases to answer why some communities successfully engaged in system management despite being located in difficult conditions as per quantitative findings and vice versa. The findings show that differences in the implementation of community participation, driven by local social relations between frontline service providers, that is, village authorities and water user groups, explain sustainable management. This initial condition of state-society relations influences how the project is initiated, kicking off negative or positive reinforcing pathways, leading to community collective action or exit. The paper concludes that the relationships between frontline government representatives and community actors are important and are an underexamined aspect of the ability of external projects to generate successful community-led management of public goods.