This paper analyzed the equitable allocation of infrastructure across regional states in Ethiopia. In general, in the past years, there has been a good start in the infrastructure sector in Ethiopia. However, the governance and equity system of infrastructure in Ethiopia is not flexible, not technology-oriented, not fair, and not easily solved. The results of in-depth interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) showed that there is a lack of institutional capacity, infrastructure governance, and equity, which has negatively impacted the state- and nation-building processes in Ethiopia. According to the interviewees, so long as the unmet demand for infrastructure exists, it remains a key restrain on doing business in most Ethiopian regional states. This is due to the lack of integrated frameworks, as there are coordination failures (lack of proper government intervention, including a lack of proper understanding and implementation of the constitution and the federal system). In Ethiopia, to reduce these bottlenecks arising from the lack of institutional capacity, infrastructure governance, and equity and their effects on nation-building, first of all, the government has to critically hear the people, deeply assess the problems, and come to the point and then discuss the problems and the way forward with the society at large.

The Sipongi System is essential in dealing with forest and land fires because this system provides real-time data that empowers stakeholders and communities to proactively overcome fire dangers. Its advantages are seen in its ability to provide detailed information regarding weather conditions, wind patterns, water levels in peatlands, air quality, and responsible work units. This data facilitates efficient decision-making and resource allocation for fire prevention and control. As an embodiment of Collaborative Governance, the Sipongi System actively involves various stakeholders, including government institutions, local communities, environmental organizations and the private sector. This cooperative approach fosters collective responsibility and accountability, improving fire management efforts. The Sipongi approach is critical in reducing forest and land fires in Indonesia by providing real-time data and a collaborative governance model. This results in faster response times, more effective fire prevention and better resource allocation. Although initially designed for Indonesia, the adaptable nature of the system makes it a blueprint for addressing similar challenges in other countries and regions, tailored to specific needs and environmental conditions. Qualitative research methods underlie this study, including interviews with key stakeholders and analysis of credible sources. Government officials, community leaders, environmental experts and organizational representatives were interviewed to comprehensively examine the mechanisms of the Sipongi System and its impact on forest and land fire management in Indonesia. Future research should explore the application of Sipongi Systems and collaborative governance in various contexts by conducting comparative studies across countries and ecosystems. Additionally, assessing the long-term impact and sustainability of the Sipongi System is critical to evaluating its effectiveness over time.

Cocoa is important for the economy and rural development of Ghana. However, small-scale cocoa production is the leading agricultural product driver of deforestation in Ghana. Uncertain tree tenure disincentivizes farmers to retain and nurture trees on their farms. There is therefore the call for structures that promote tree retention and management within cocoa farming. We examined tenure barriers and governance for tree resources on cocoa farms. Data was collected from 200 cocoa farmers from two regions using multistage sampling technique. Information was gathered on tree ownership and fate of tree resources on cocoa farms, tree felling permit acquisition and associated challenges and illegal logging and compensation payments on cocoa farms. Results suggest 62.2% of farmers own trees on their farms. However, these farmers may or may not have ownership rights over the trees depending on the ownership of their farmlands. More than half of the farmers indicated they require felling permits to harvest trees on their farms, indicative of the awareness of established tree harvesting procedures. Seventy percent of the farmers have never experienced illegal logging on their farms. There is however the need to educate the remaining 30% on their rights and build their compensation negotiation powers for destructions to their cocoa crops. This study has highlighted ownership and governance issues with cocoa farming and it is important for the sustainability of on-farm tree resources and Ghana’s forest at large.

This article analyzes the use and limitations of nonmonetary contract incentives in managing third-party accountability in human services. In-depth case studies of residential care homes for the elderly and integrated family service centers, two contrasting contracting contexts, were conducted in Hong Kong. These two programs vary in service programmability and service interdependency. In-depth interviews with 17 managers of 48 Residential Care Homes for the Elderly (RCHEs) and 20 managers of 10 Integrated Family Service Centers (IFSCs) were conducted. Interviews with the managers show that when service programmability was high and service interdependency was low, nonmonetary contract incentives such as opportunities for self-actualization professionally or reputation were effective in improving service quality from nonprofit and for-profit contractors. When service programmability was low and service interdependency was high, despite that only nonprofit organizations were contracted, many frontline service managers reported that professional accountability was undermined by ambiguous service scope, performance emphasis on case turnover, risk shift from public service units and a lack of formal accountability relationships between service units in the service network. The findings shed light on the limitations of nonmonetary contract incentives.

This study provides an empirical examination of the design and modification of China’s urban social security programme. In doing so, this study complements the popular assumption regarding the correlation between economic growth and social security development. Focusing on the economic and political motivations behind the ruling party’s decision to implement social security, this study first discusses the modification of urban social security and welfare in China. It then empirically demonstrates the mechanisms behind the system’s operation. This study proposes the following hypothesis: in a country like China, a change in the doctrine of the ruling party will affect government alliances, negating the positive impact of economic growth on the development of social security. In demonstrating this hypothesis, this study identifies a political precondition impacting the explanatory power of popular conceptions of social security development.