Cocoa is important for the economy and rural development of Ghana. However, small-scale cocoa production is the leading agricultural product driver of deforestation in Ghana. Uncertain tree tenure disincentivizes farmers to retain and nurture trees on their farms. There is therefore the call for structures that promote tree retention and management within cocoa farming. We examined tenure barriers and governance for tree resources on cocoa farms. Data was collected from 200 cocoa farmers from two regions using multistage sampling technique. Information was gathered on tree ownership and fate of tree resources on cocoa farms, tree felling permit acquisition and associated challenges and illegal logging and compensation payments on cocoa farms. Results suggest 62.2% of farmers own trees on their farms. However, these farmers may or may not have ownership rights over the trees depending on the ownership of their farmlands. More than half of the farmers indicated they require felling permits to harvest trees on their farms, indicative of the awareness of established tree harvesting procedures. Seventy percent of the farmers have never experienced illegal logging on their farms. There is however the need to educate the remaining 30% on their rights and build their compensation negotiation powers for destructions to their cocoa crops. This study has highlighted ownership and governance issues with cocoa farming and it is important for the sustainability of on-farm tree resources and Ghana’s forest at large.

This article analyzes the use and limitations of nonmonetary contract incentives in managing third-party accountability in human services. In-depth case studies of residential care homes for the elderly and integrated family service centers, two contrasting contracting contexts, were conducted in Hong Kong. These two programs vary in service programmability and service interdependency. In-depth interviews with 17 managers of 48 Residential Care Homes for the Elderly (RCHEs) and 20 managers of 10 Integrated Family Service Centers (IFSCs) were conducted. Interviews with the managers show that when service programmability was high and service interdependency was low, nonmonetary contract incentives such as opportunities for self-actualization professionally or reputation were effective in improving service quality from nonprofit and for-profit contractors. When service programmability was low and service interdependency was high, despite that only nonprofit organizations were contracted, many frontline service managers reported that professional accountability was undermined by ambiguous service scope, performance emphasis on case turnover, risk shift from public service units and a lack of formal accountability relationships between service units in the service network. The findings shed light on the limitations of nonmonetary contract incentives.

The Sipongi System is essential in dealing with forest and land fires because this system provides real-time data that empowers stakeholders and communities to proactively overcome fire dangers. Its advantages are seen in its ability to provide detailed information regarding weather conditions, wind patterns, water levels in peatlands, air quality, and responsible work units. This data facilitates efficient decision-making and resource allocation for fire prevention and control. As an embodiment of Collaborative Governance, the Sipongi System actively involves various stakeholders, including government institutions, local communities, environmental organizations and the private sector. This cooperative approach fosters collective responsibility and accountability, improving fire management efforts. The Sipongi approach is critical in reducing forest and land fires in Indonesia by providing real-time data and a collaborative governance model. This results in faster response times, more effective fire prevention and better resource allocation. Although initially designed for Indonesia, the adaptable nature of the system makes it a blueprint for addressing similar challenges in other countries and regions, tailored to specific needs and environmental conditions. Qualitative research methods underlie this study, including interviews with key stakeholders and analysis of credible sources. Government officials, community leaders, environmental experts and organizational representatives were interviewed to comprehensively examine the mechanisms of the Sipongi System and its impact on forest and land fire management in Indonesia. Future research should explore the application of Sipongi Systems and collaborative governance in various contexts by conducting comparative studies across countries and ecosystems. Additionally, assessing the long-term impact and sustainability of the Sipongi System is critical to evaluating its effectiveness over time.

This study was conducted to examine the roles of interconnected stakeholders based on power and interests in Ecotourism Management Policy for Dalegan Beach, Gresik Regency, Indonesia using a qualitative method. Data were collected through observation, in-depth interviews, and focus group discussions with stakeholders. Furthermore, the identification of stakeholders interest in ecotourism development was based on the strengths, important positions, and influence of stakeholders categorized into several groups. The results showed that there were three categories of stakeholders, namely Main, Supporting, and Key. In the Village Government, Dalegan Beach Tourism Manager acted as a key player and the local community had the main role. Additionally, East Java Province Maritime and Fisheries Service, Gresik Regency Tourism and Creative Economy Office, Culture, Youth and Sports Office, Gresik Regency Public Works and Spatial Planning Service, and Commanditaire Vennotschaap Mahera (CV Mahera), the landowner, were recognized for lacking direct inclusion in policy matters. Different influences were reported on the legal decisions of the government to offer insights to policymakers in tourism governance. Subsequent study could examine the conflicts of interest among stakeholders.