In the current context of China’s vigorous development of its high-speed rail (HSR) network to accelerate the realization of connectivity, which is the aim of the “Belt and Road” initiative, it is crucial to study how the specific opening of HSR enhances enterprise human capital investment efficiency. Using a multiple-time-point difference-in-differences (DID) regression model, we empirically study data from listed Chinese companies. An HSR opening can promote the efficiency of an enterprise’s human capital investment. We further explore the relationship between HSR and a company’s human capital investment, by considering the moderating effects of firm property rights and foreign shareholding. Our findings indicate that these factors can enhance the impact of HSR on the efficiency of firms’ investments in human capital. Finally, to ensure the reliability of our experimental findings, we employed a combination of propensity score matching and the DID methodology. The findings of this study offer empirical evidence that can inform enterprise management strategies and provide valuable insights for policymakers seeking to promote economic growth.

This article analyzes the use and limitations of nonmonetary contract incentives in managing third-party accountability in human services. In-depth case studies of residential care homes for the elderly and integrated family service centers, two contrasting contracting contexts, were conducted in Hong Kong. These two programs vary in service programmability and service interdependency. In-depth interviews with 17 managers of 48 Residential Care Homes for the Elderly (RCHEs) and 20 managers of 10 Integrated Family Service Centers (IFSCs) were conducted. Interviews with the managers show that when service programmability was high and service interdependency was low, nonmonetary contract incentives such as opportunities for self-actualization professionally or reputation were effective in improving service quality from nonprofit and for-profit contractors. When service programmability was low and service interdependency was high, despite that only nonprofit organizations were contracted, many frontline service managers reported that professional accountability was undermined by ambiguous service scope, performance emphasis on case turnover, risk shift from public service units and a lack of formal accountability relationships between service units in the service network. The findings shed light on the limitations of nonmonetary contract incentives.